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SOME ASPECTS OF MANAGEMENT FEES OF MUTUAL FUNDS
E. WYMERSCH*
I.

O

INTRODUCTION

N November 2, 1966 the Securities and Exchange Commission released an
important report on the "Public Policy Implications of Investment Company Growth." 1 This report was preceded by three other reports which dealt
in varying degrees with investment companies. In 1940, Congress enacted the
Investment Company Act 2 and the Investment Advisers Act 3 on the recommendations made by the Commission in its "Report on Investment Trusts and
Investment Companies."' 4 In 1958, pursuant to its authority under section 14(b)
of the Investment Company Act, the Commission authorized the Securities
Research Unit of the Wharton School of Finance and Commerce of the University of Pennsylvania to study the problem again. The conclusions of the
Wharton Report5 were to some extent supplemented by the Special Study.6
The basic allegation of the Commission in its 1966 Report was that in
the matter of management fees, investment companies have only to a minimal
extent shared in the economies of size realized through the growth of the
industry. In order to redress these allegedly excessive fees, the Commission
proposed the introduction of a standard of reasonableness, to be determined
by the courts on action by the shareholder of the Commission.
This present article will attempt to analyze the existence and the consequences of the fiduciary duty and status of the investment adviser pointing to
the possibility of an alternate solution within the existing legal framework, which
would come very close to the proposed test of "reasonableness." Finally the
adequacy of either solution will be questioned.
II.

GENER.L PAurRNs

Investment companies are defined in section 3(a) of the Investment
Company Act as any issuer which:
*
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1. Report of the Securities and Exchange Commission on the Public Policy Implications of Investment Company Growth, H. Rep. No. 2337, 89th Cong. 2d Sess. 1966 [hereinafter referred to as the SEC Report, Mutual Fund Report, or Report].
2. Investment Company Act, 54 Stat. 789 (1940), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1
et seq. (1964).
3. Investment Advisers Act, 54 Stat. 847 (1940), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-1
et seq. (1964).
4. Investment Trusts and Investment Companies, Report of the S.E.C. pursuant to
s. 30 of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, on Investment Counsel, Investment Management, Investment Supervisory and Investment Advisory Services, H.R. Doc.
No. 477, 76th Cong. 2d Sess. 1 (1939).
5. Wharton School of Finance and Commerce, A Study of Mutual Funds, H. Rep.
No. 2274, 87th Cong. 2d Sess. 1 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Wharton Report].
6. Report of the Special Study of the Securities Markets, H. Doc. No. 995, 88th
Cong. 1st Sess (1963).
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1) is or holds itself out as being engaged primarily, or proposes to
engage primarily, in the business of investing, reinvesting, or
trading in securities;
2) is engaged or proposes to engage in the business of issuing faceamount certificates of the installment type, or has been engaged
in such business and has any such certificate outstanding; or
3) is engaged or proposes to engage in the business of investing,
reinvesting, owning, holding, or trading in securities, and owns or
proposes to acquire investment securities having a value exceeding
40 per centum of the value of such issuer's total assets (exclusive
of Government securities and cash items) on an unconsolidated
basis.
The Act further subdivides the investment companies in: section 4
1) face-amount certificate company ....
2) unit investment trust ....
3) Management company, means an investment company other than a
face-amount certificate company or a unit investment trust.
The management companies are further divided into closed-end and openend companies. The latter are management companies which are: "offering for
sale or ha[ve] outstanding any redeemable security of which [they are] the
issuer." This article will only deal with the open-end investment companies.
Among the open-end investment companies, distinction should further be
made between those having internal management and those being externally
managed. The companies of the first category are managed like any other
corporation. They are very limited in number and assets. Companies of the
second category are managed under a "management contract," also called
the investment advisory contract. Their existence is not expressly recognized
in the Act, although several provisions can only be applied to them. This
section will further be limited to these externally managed companies.
Mutual funds, which is an imprecise way of indicating both internally
and externally managed open-end investment companies, are organized under
various forms, with the corporate form and the trust form the most commonly
encountered. The different organizational patterns have only a minor influence
on the question here involved, and therefore will be put on the same footing.
The basic statutory structure can be briefly outlined as follows: a number
of individuals pool an amount of capital (at least $100,000, as section 14(a) (1)
of the Act requires). That capital, the fund, will be managed by its elected
directors, assisted in their task by the investment adviser, a contractually
appointed organization. Special guarantees are provided to avoid too stringent
a relationship between the adviser and the fund, The fund must stand ready
7
to redeem its shares at any time.
7. The fact that prospective investors, in choosing a particular fund, rely on the
identity of the adviser has several consequences. It makes the stability of the relationship
between the adviser and the fund essential. It further caused that only a minor role was
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But in reality, it works quite differently. The initiative comes almost
invariably from the adviser or the affiliated brokerage house. The adviser,
together with his affiliates or friends, will constitute the board of directors
of the fund. Securities will be offered to the public through the "underwriter,"
often controlled by the adviser or vice-versa. The management contract and

the underwriting contract are "negotiated" between the fund and the adviser
or underwriter. From this pattern arise a number of specific consequences which
,are to a large extent responsible for the heavy attack on the mutual fund
industry. In substance they amount to what was called in rather strong terms
a "business incest." 8 The essence of the objections go to the fact that notwithstanding the several different corporate entities, the whole system is dominated
by a few people.9 The contracts between the fund and these different corporate
entities do not reflect arm's length bargaining.' 0 Although this domination
aspect exists in several other publicly owned corporations, the investment company has some unique characteristics. For example, investment advisers usually
have a rather limited capital interest in the assets of the fund. Two other
aspects must be underlined in this context, viz., the lack of any real stockholder
democracy and the inability of the independent directors to fulfill their statutory duties as independent checks on management. These factors have given
the investment adviser almost absolute control of the activities of the fund,
which is most dramatically expressed in the matter of management contracts.
But before analyzing how these two limitations on management's discretion

have worked, it will first be necessary to consider how Congress in 1940 viewed
their relative roles.
Present regulation is the result of a compromise." The proposed bill was
much more stringent, but on vigorous opposition from the industry, the most
salient parts were deleted. Nevertheless, several areas can be indicated where
the original regulatory pattern has not been deleted. The Act, which generally
designated to the independent directors. See Hearings on S. 3580 Before a Subcomm. of the
Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 76th Cong. 3d Sess. 422 (1940); Lehr, The Affiliation of Commercial Bank and Mutual Fund Personnel, 83 Banking L.J. 377, 399, 471
(1966); see also Jaretzki, Jr., Duties and Responsibilities of Directors of Mutual Funds,
29 Law & Contemp. Prob. 777 (1964) who stresses that reliance is particularly evident
when the fund bears the name of the advisor. Some authors have considered the mutual
fund structure as a bunch of management contracts, whereby each investor separately has
his money invested and managed by the adviser. See Lobell, A Critique on the Wharton
Report on Mutual Funds, 49 Va. L. Rev. 9, 38 (1963); Herman, Lobell on the Wharton
Study of Mutual Funds, A Rebuttal, 49 Va. L. Rev. 938 (1963). This view neglects the
collective aspects in the structure and conflicts with many of the specific characteristics
of the whole pattern. See Saminsky v. Abbott, 40 Del. Ch. 528, 534, 185 A.2d 765, 769 (1961).
8. Note, The Mutual Fund and its Management Company, an Analysis of Business
Incest, 71 Yale L.J. 137 (1961).
9. See Comment, Termination of Management Contracts Under the Investment
Company Act of 1940, 63 Colum. L. Rev. 733, 745 (1963); Note, Mutual Funds and the
Investment Advisory Contract, 50 Va. L. Rev. 141, 157 (1964).
10. But see SEC Holding Company Act Release No. 1868, at 9-10.
11. See Conwill, Blight or Blessing, The Wharton School Study of Mutual Funds, 18
Bus. Law. 663 (1963); Comment, The Investment Company Act of 1940, 50 Yale L.J.
440 (1940.)
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tends to protect "the national interest and the investor" includes some specific
regulations relating to the question here under consideration.
The general trend of these provisions is to protect the shareholders from
too much interrelationship, sometimes alleged as collusion, between the investment company's board and "its contractual organs," the adviser and the
underwriter. This general policy has been expressed in section 1 (b) (2) whereby
it is declared that the national public interest and the interest of investors are
adversely affected
when investment companies are organized, operated, managed, or their
portfolio securities selected, in the interest of directors, officers, investment advisers, depositors, or their affiliated persons thereof, . . . rather
than in the interest of all classes of such company's security holders.
This statement of policy is further implemented by several particular
subsections, under sections, 14, 17, and 32. By virtue of section 10(a) at least
40 per centum of the board of directors must be unaffiliated with the adviser,
unless the investment company meets the requirements of section 10(d), viz., in
substance be a no-load fund with management fee not exceeding 1 per centum,
in which case one director only must be unaffiliated. Special provision is also
made as to the auditors, for which the requirements are even stricter. Prior
to 1940, most abuses were encountered in the field of self-dealing; the Act, in
section 17, outlaws or regulates these practices.
The advisory function itself is regulated by section 15 which declares it
unlawful for anyone to act as investment adviser unless pursuant to a written
contract, and which also provides for a precise description of all compensation
to be paid under the contract. Approval of the majority of the outstanding
voting securities is necessary to make the contract effective. Termination will
ensue automatically upon assignment by the adviser, or may be effectuated by
the board or majority of the outstanding securities, without penalty and on
60 days' notice. The contract can only last for two years and must even then
be approved annually by the unaffiliated members of the board or the majority
of the outstanding securities.
The content of the investment advisory contract as well as the rates to
be charged was wholly omitted from the statute. It was felt that this question
should be left to the parties, and that if someone was willing to pay a high
fee, that should be left to him.12 The remedies available under the Act, apart
from the remedies in law and equity under state law, are laid down in section
36, whereby the Commission, on a finding of "gross negligence or gross abuse
of trust," may apply to a federal court for the termination of the relationship
12. Disclosure alone was found insufficient by Congress, S. Rep. 1779, 76th Cong. 3rd
Sess. 4 (1940). See also the statement that: "No amount of disclosure can make corporate democracy effective where the corporate vote belongs to weak, scattered individual
investors ... who cannot or will not take effective part in the corporate electoral process.
Rostow, To Whom and for What Ends Is CorporateManagement Responsible?, in The Cor-

poration in Modern Society (E. Mason 1960). See infra note 38 and accompanying text.
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between the adviser and the fund. Therefore, in the next section, the state
corporation law, which could have bearing upon these questions, will be analyzed.
How unsatisfactorily the Congressional guarantees have worked might
easily be demonstrated by reviewing the two main safeguards, apart from
disclosure, by which Congress hoped to adequately protect the investors. These
guarantees lie in the role of the independent directors and of the stockholders.
III.

DInECToPs oF EXTERNALLY-MANAGED OPEN-END

INVESTMAENT COMPANIES

Under the prevailing legal theories the intervention of the directors in
the corporate activities is highly important. 13 They owe a fiduciary duty to the
corporation and, according to some authorities, to the stockholders.' They can
be held liable for self-dealing when they enter into contracts with the corporation or cause contracts to be entered into between the fund and another
corporation in which they have a controlling interest. Compensation awarded
to themselves is actionable under certain conditions. It is therefore of the
highest importance to determine what are the actual ties between the directors
and the fund.
According to the provisions of the Investment Company Act a majority
of the board of directors of the fund may be affiliated with the adviser. This
situation creates a potential conflict of interest situation. However, Congress
for different reasons permitted this affiliation. This was again the result of a
long negotiated compromise. One of the reasons for having affiliated persons
as directors was that if the majority of the board were not affiliated this would
make the position of the adviser extremely precarious. The adviser could have
less interest in the optimum performance of the contract, of which he was the
only judge. In case of clear dissent this could even lead to a refusal by the
adviser to perform his contractual duties. The fund would be left without its
adviser and in many instances even without its officers. Hence it is a natural
consequence that the adviser to whom the welfare of the fund is entrusted,
could easily impose its will. A great turn-over of advisers would also be to the
detriment of the fund. Therefore, as long as Congress will permit mutual funds
to be externally managed, it should envisage a stable relationship between the
fund and its adviser. On the other hand, Congress feared leaving the investors
without any protection. In order to protect them against oppression and other
abuses, it enacted a series of measures providing for independent checks on the
large liberties of the adviser. The provision for independent directors who shall
constitute at least 40 per centum of the board of the fund (with an exception
for funds meeting certain requirements, as no-load, etc.) is part of a larger plan
to mitigate between the danger of a needed stable fund-adviser relationship and
13. See J.K. Galbraith, The New Industrial State (1967)
"the technostructure" in modem corporate life.
14. See infra note 38.

who stresses the role of
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the protection of investors.r 5 Following the same line of reasoning, Congress
also required an audit be made by independent accountants. 10 This requirement
can easily be compared to that relative to independent directors. The question
now arises as to how far independent directors have successfully performed
their statutory duty, i.e., the protection of the investors. The question could
also be raised as to how far independent directors could be expected not to
disregard the interests of the investors, but at the same time not go along with
the adviser's propositions. Indeed, independent directors are seriously handicapped in the performance of their duties. As long as the relationship with the
adviser is positive, the director cannot from one day to the next change his
position or attitude. If he wants to retain his job, he should not disregard the
wishes of the adviser, which is powerful in determining the fund's management
and policy, and also has great influence on the shareholders to whom it is
evolved to elect all directors, the independent inclusive. The adviser has not
only the advantage of his personal fame, but also has access to the powerful
proxy machinery. The voice of a disagreeing director will hardly be heard in
the concert of praises of the adviser, to whom the investors entrusted their
money. And even if he can obtain sufficient support at the board's meeting to
spell the adviser's lesson, he risks bringing the fund's performance in danger,
by leaving the fund without any advisory assistance, which would probably
be disastrous to the fund. Moreover, if the director is friendly he will often be
viewed as not independent, but dominated by the adviser, or its affiliated
persons. 17 He also does not possess the technical advantages of the adviser
or its affiliates. They have access to all documents and reports, have a numerous
and devoted staff, and are in full-time employment of the fund, or at least
closely related to it.
All this does not mean that independent directors are wholly superfluous. But the role they perform cannot be said to be the one thought of by
Congress. The Wharton Report stated that unaffiliated directors "may be of
restricted value as an instrument for providing effective representation of mutual
fund shareholders in dealings between the fund and its investment adviser.' 8
After more than twenty-five years it is doubtful whether the unaffiliated
directors have been able to perform what Congress expected from them. In fact,
affiliated as well as independent directors find themselves in a dilemma. On the
one hand, the affiliated director owes a fiduciary duty to the fund, but on the
other he is supposed to ensure the most favorable terms for the advisory corpo15. See the conditions in Matter of I.T.S. Mgmt. Corp., 10 S.E.C. 695 (1941); Matter
of Management Associates, 9 S.E.C. 645 (1941).
16. Conwill, supra note 11; Marsh, Jr., Are Directors Trustees?, 22 Bus. Law. 35,
54 (1966) ("What did you expect, self-appointed strangers?"). See also Jaretzki, Jr.,
supra note 7 (It is the responsibility of the affiliate directors to see that the independent
directors meet the requirements of the acts; mere friendship does not warrant suspicion.).
17. As to the value of bank audits see Lasdon, Investment and Finance, 83 Banking
L.J. 466, 467 (1966).
18. Wharton Report 34.
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ration of which he is a delegate. Also he should be mindful that the least
expensive advisory contract is not always the best for the investors. The unaffiliated directors, who cannot devote so much time to the activities of the fund,
and who are not so royally remunerated, will be unlikely to vote that the
advisory contract should be discontinued even when they are really convinced
that it would be in the best interest of the fund. Further, there is the problem
of finding duly qualified independent directors, of whom the shareholders,
theoretically at least, expect sufficient financial knowledge and sophistication to
"effectively question, discuss and evaluate the proposed actions of those members
of the board who have direct financial interest, by virtue of dual affiliation, in
the fund's management or distributing company."' 9
But can he in fact be expected to possess all those virtues? That would
impose insuperable difficulties upon the affiliated directors in nominating the
statutorily required independent directors. Moreover, independent directors, in
accepting their election, become exposed to shareholder attack for activities they
were not in a moral position to avoid. How limited their role has been up to
now can be deduced from the existing shareholder litigation where it appears
that they have not been able to avoid burdensome advisory contracts for the
fund.
Finally, it should also be stressed that the investors put their confidence and
reliance on the adviser, or eventually its affiliates within the fund, and rarely
elect a fund in reliance on the independent directors that preside on its board.
It has even been questioned whether the investors bought at all in reliance on
the identity of the adviser, and it has also been argued that some investors do
20
not even know the name of the adviser.
For all these reasons, it can seriously be questioned whether the independent
directors still fulfill their statutory function and even whether they fulfill any
function at all.
IV.

SHAREHiOLDER RATIFICATION

Not only directorial approval has impressed the courts, the almost unanimous shareholder vote has also put its weight in the balancing of equities. The
majorities obtained in mutual fund election, if not unique in the field of publicly
owned companies, is at least a palpable token of the blind trust of the less
knowledgeable investor in the adviser of his choice. So, in an election organized
in 1961, 98% of the votes cast in the One William Street Fund were in favor
of the continuance of the relationship with Lehman Brothers, the investment
adviser, while in Saxe v. Brady, 99.1% of the votes cast reaffirmed their belief
in the adviser.2 ' Although this is not a matter to make the observer suspicious,
19. Lehr, supra note 7, at 396.
20. See Jaretzki, Jr., supra note 7 as to reliance. But as to lack of knowledge of the
identity of the adviser see Note, supra note 8.
21. Saxe v. Brady, 40 Del. ch. 474, 184 A.2d 602 (1962). See also N.Y. Times, March
22, 1961, at 63, col. 4.
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it demonstrates the lethargy of the shareholders, which is a general trend in
corporate life. Some observers, including Professor Berle, go even further and
say that a new form of collectivism is emerging.2 2 Whatever these considerations,
the inherent dangers of this situation and the large general interest involved
require special protections for the less sophisticated investors. The situation in
the mutual fund sector is of more concern in that, unlike other large publicly
owned corporations, the holdings of the mutual fund are more scattered, and in
some larger funds, extremely diverse.2 3 In large public companies, although the
majority of the stock may be in the hands of thousands, or even millions of
people, the existence of an interested minority group will often give some protection to the majority of shareholders. Although the question of shareholder
protection is usually posed in terms of minority to be protected against the
dominating position of majority, in modern corporate life a converse situation
will more often occur. 24 In these days, it seems a fact that the rights of the
stockholders are gradually being eroded by the increasing power of the managing
groups, the duties and responsibilities of which ,are being extended. Management's ability is sometimes checked by large institutional stockholders, which
in some corporations own up to 50%. Nothing similar exists in the mutual fund
sector. Large stockholdings, or even institutional stockholdings exist, but they
are the exception rather than the rule. Moreover, one should not forget that
mutual fund shares address themselves to a different public than the shares of
other public corporations. The protection of the small investor should therefore
be the guideline of any reform in the mutual fund industry. Congress, in 1940,
had this in mind, but due to the more urgent considerations of the threatening
war, outlawed only the more shocking abuses. The result was that now an
unsatisfied investor can but redeem his shares, whereby he will suffer substantial
losses, not only due to the redemption fee, in many cases 1%o, but also his loss
of yield and costs of reinvestment, which last point is particularly heavy for
the less sophisticated investor, whose investment choice is limited to one of the
more popular investment media, as the mutual funds. 25
22. Berle, Yr., Economic Power & Free Society, Dec. 1957, at 9. Pension Funds were
said to be "chewing up" control of corporations.
23. Wharton Report 53-57.

24. Arendt, La protection des tninoritis dans les socitis anonymes en droit luxernbourgeois, in Liber Amicorum Fredericq 127-50 (1961).
25. See Rome v. Archer, 41 Del. Ch. 404, 197 A.2d 49 (1964); Krieger v. Anderson,

40 Del. Ch. 61, 173 A.2d 626 (1961), aff'd, 40 Del. Ch. 363, 182 A.2d 907 (1962); Glicken

v. Bradford 35 F.R.D. 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Lobell, Rights and Responsibilities it the
Mutual Fund, 70 Yale L.J. 1259, 1263 (1961); Lobell, The Mutual Fund, A Structural
Analysis, 47 Va. L. Rev. 181, 190 (1961) This question is related to the sophistication of

the mutual fund investors see generally Lobell, A Critique on the Wharton School Report
on Mutual Funds, 49 Va. L. Rev. 1 (1963), referring to a Survey on Knowledge of and
Attitudes toward Mutual Funds (1962) where 93% of the persons interviewed said to be
"satisfied" with their mutual fund investments. This was called an "Alice in Wonderland"
classic, in Herman, Lobell on the Wharton Study of Mutual Funds, A Rebuttal, 49 Va. L.

Rev. 938 (1963) See also Note, supra note 8, at 168 n.90. In Robe, Trends in the Mutual
Fund Industry, Inv. Dealers' Dig., Dec. 12, 1966, at 20, the untapped market of potential
mutual fund investors was said to be enormous and evaluated at 50 million families.
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Opposed to the helplessness of the investor are the powerful means of the
investment adviser. His power is not limited but only subject to occasional
control. And even the influence of the independent board members should
be seriously questioned. The adviser moreover has disposition of the proxy
machinery, which is often decisive. Objection from the investors, and from the
independent directors, will be and, in fact, is extremely rare. The chances of
success in a proxy fight are minimal even in an ordinary public corporation. In
the mutual funds, the very nature of the investment medium precludes the
small investor from entering into a proxy fight where the larger stockholder
will find less difficulties in redeeming his shares, partially due to the scaled-down
sales load. Apart from the proxy machinery, the adviser also controls the corporation through such means as his dominating influence on the board, his relations
with the independent directors (who were picked and nominated by him), his
control of the fund's policy and eventual performance, his affiliation with the
underwriter and the sales organization, and the like. 26 The adviser typically
represents a case of management control, whereby management perpetuates itself
without having a substantial ownership in the risk-bearing capital.7 In this
context some attention should also be given to the existing disclosure devices
and their effectiveness. As one author has stressed, the Special Study in this
field "underscored what many people knew, that individual investors frequently
[do] not use the prospectus as a primary aid in determining whether to purchase
a particular security. The key to the sale often was the salesman. '28 Although
considerations relating to sales of mutual fund shares are beyond the scope of
this article, it should not be forgotten that disclosure devices are of little, if any,
protection to an unsophisticated investor who is confronted by an aggressive
salesman.20 Further, during the course of his investment, his attention will not
go to the question of management remuneration but to what return he receives
on his investment.80
26. Dissatisfied stockholders can only redeem their shares. But their lack of redemption
does not mean an approval of the management's activities, thereby strengthening management's control position. See Saminsky v. Abbott, 40 Del. Ch. 528, 537 185 A.2d 765, 772
(1961).
27. Berle, Jr., Power Without Property 70-76 (1956), cited in Economic Power &

the Free Society, Dec., 1957, of the same author, management was called "an automatic,
self-perpetuating oligarchy." Id. at 9.

28. Mundheim, Foreword, 29 Law & Contemp. Prob. 647 (1964); see also, Carter,
Mutual Investment Funds, 27 Harv. Bus. Rev. 714 (1964).

29. For some of the sales techniques, see Conwill, Minority Menace to Mutual Fund

Selling, 18 Bus. Law. 1055 (1963.

30. Shortly after the SEC Report was released, sales of mutual fund shares still
exceeded redemptions which had gone up slightly. This was sufficient to say that "if
fund sales have not been greatly affected by this time, i.e., the release of the Report, it is

pretty safe to assume that mutual fund investors realize and understand the basic concept

of mutual fund investment and that the sales and management charges are not motivating

factors in the final analysis." Cascio, Follow-up on S.E.C. Report, Inv. Dealers' Dig., Dec.
19, 1966, at 40. Obviously this is a singleminded comment. The redemption privilege threat

was heavily stressed by one author. See Lobell, A Critique on the Wharton School Report
of Mutual Funds, 49 Va. L. Rev. 1 (1963), while the opposite was argued by Herman,
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V. THE FIDucIAy STATUS OF THE INVEST1MNT ADVISER
A. Fiduciaries
I venture to assert that when the history of the financial era which
has just drawn to a close comes to be written, most of its mistakes and
its major faults will be ascribed to the failure to observe the fiduciary
principle, the precepts old as holy writ, that a man cannot serve two
masters.
Chief Justice Stone3l
Some human relationships are characterized by the fact that one party
undertakes to act in the sole interest of another, who puts a high degree of
trust and reliance upon the promissor. But conversely, this situation gives the
trusted party wide latitude for "faithless behaviour." Equity devised special,
adequate means to protect the entrusting party against such abuses committed
by the trustee. Later, the standard of conduct expected from the trustee became
more strict and he was held to what is now called "an undivided loyalty" towards
the cestui que trust.
The concept of trust has given birth to an related concept, that of a "fiduciary" which is the very gist of the trust figure. The similarities of situations
has promoted a broadening of the concept. Today, the fiduciary label is used
in a wide variety of more or less comparable situations.
The diversity of fiduciary relations has made it obvious that the intensity
of the duty of loyalty is also subject to variation. History has brought under the
fiduciary label such relationships as those existing between a layman and his
doctor, lawyer, banker,32 stockbroker, and salesman. All these relationships have
in common that the promissor is held to a degree of care, which is higher than
the care expected from an ordinary contractual party. This duty of loyalty has
been defined as the "willing and practical and thorough-going devotion of a
person to a cause," thus equating it to the "fulfilment of the whole moral law,
when loyalty is properly defined."33 This broad definition suggests that the
content of the duty of loyalty is not easy to define, and that it has to be worked
out situation by situation.34 Clearly, the moral duties of a lawyer or a doctor
to his respective client or patient cannot entirely be put on the same footing as
the ties existing between a mutual fund salesman and a prospective investor. This
difference is mainly a difference of intensity. Although starting from the same
general proposition, the prerequisites, consequences, enforcement, and sanctions
will also differ. It seems that the intensity of the duty of loyalty parallels the
degree of independent authority to be exercised by the fiduciary.3
Lobell on the Wharton School Report on Mutual Funds, a Rebuttal, 49 Va. L. Rev. 938
(1963).

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Stone, Address on the Public Influence of the Bar, 48 Harv L. Rev. 1, 8 (1934).
See Hun v. Carey, 82 N.Y. 65 (1880).
R. Royce, The Philosophy of Loyalty 15, 16 (1930).
Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U.S. 132, 147 152 (1891).
Scott, The Fiduciary Principle, 37 Calif. L. Rev. 539 (1949). See Twin-Lick Oil
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In the corporate field it is recognized that directors have duties of loyalty.
It had long been a question whether they were trustees rather than agents for
the stockholders, because the comparison could not be upheld in every detail
of the relationship. Finally, courts brought their status under the broad umbrella
of "fiduciaries." Today, it is generally accepted that directors, and probably to
a lesser extent officers,36 have fiduciary duties towards the corporation for which
they act. But as Justice Frankfurter stated:
To say that a man is a fiduciary only begins analysis; it gives direction
to further inquiry. To whom is he a fiduciary? What obligations does
he owe as a fiduciary? In what respect has he failed to discharge these
obligations?
And what are the consequences of this deviation from
37
duty?
If the existence of a duty of loyalty owed by the directors to the corporation
does not seem subject to any doubt, the existence of this duty to the shareholders is far from settled.38 The existence of the duty towards the public
generally is not yet accepted. 39 For present purposes, however, it may be
assumed that there are means by which the stockholders can compel the directors
to account for their activities, whether through the means of a derivative suit
or by virtue of their own right.
The mutual fund field presents rather uncommon features in that it involves
strong elements of trust. Where the management is internal, there is no reason
to differentiate this situation from that presented by other publicly held corporations. But when management is externalized, in other words where the directors
of the fund, as well as the investment adviser, decide upon the management of
the corporation, it seems necessary to determine what, if any, duties of loyalty
are applicable to the investment manager.
Legally the ties with the fund are only contractual, and although this does
not bar the existence of a fiduciary relationship, it could be argued that the
Co. v. Marbury, 91 U.S. 587 (1875); SEC v. Insurance Sec., 254 F.2d 642 (9th Cir. 1958);
Carr v. National Bank & Loan Co., 43 App. Div. 10, 59 N.Y.S. 618 (4th Dep't 1899); See
also McLure v. Luke, 154 F. 647 (9th Cir. 1907); Schweickhardt v. Chessen, 329 Ill. 637,
161 N.E. 118 (1928).
36. See H. Henn, Corporations, § 231, at 362 (1961).
37. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 85-86 (1943); Brudney, Fiduciary Ideology
in Transactions Affecting Corporate Control, 65 Mich. L. Rev. 259 (1966).
38. See Taussig v. Wellington, Inc., 187 F. Supp. 179 (D. Del. 1960); see also Ashman
v. Miller, 101 F.2d 85, 90, 91 (6th Cir. 1939); Gerdes v, Reynolds, 28 N.Y.S.2d 622, 650
(Sup. Ct. 1941) (Even controlling stockholders can have fiduciary obligations to the
minority.); Marsh, Jr., supra note 16; Scott, supra note 35.
39. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306 (1939) (duties to creditors of corporation);
Garret, Duties and Responsibilities of Corporate Directors 22 Bus. Law, 29, 34 (1966)
denied existence of the duty to the public generally. The existence of fiduciary duties of
promoters of the corporation to the corporation is also subject to doubt, See Old Dominion
Copper & Smelting Co. v. Lewisohn, 210 U.S. 206 (1907); Old Dominion Copper & Smelting
Co. v. Bigelow, 203 Mass. 159, 89 N.E. 193 (1909); see also San Juan Uranium Corp. v.
Wolfe, 241 F.2d 121 (10th Cir. 1957); but see McCandless v. Furlaud, 296 U.S. 140 (1935)
(distinguished Old Dominion); Saminsky v. Abbott, 40 Del. ch. 528, 185 A.2d 765 (1961)
(denied fiduciary duty of investment manager to prospective mutual fund investor).
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existence of loyalty duties owed by the directors of the fund, prevents additional
similar duties owed by the contractor.
The fiduciary character of the investment advisory function is largely
accepted. In the declaration of policy in the original bill which led to the
Investment Advisers Act of 1940, it was stated to affect the "national public
interest and the interest of the investors adversely . ..when the business of
investment advisers is so conducted as to defraud or mislead investors, or to
enable such advisers to relieve themselves of their fiduciary obligations to their
clients." 40
In the hearings which were held after the introduction of this bill, many
professional investment advisors stressed the "trust and confidence" which characterized their profession, and in this connection the testimony of the president
of the Investment Counsel Association of America is particularly noteworthy:
Two fundamental principles upon which the pioneers in this new profession undertook to meet the growing need for unbiased investment
information and guidance were, first, that they would limit their efforts
and activities to the study of investment problems from the investor's
standpoint, not engaging in any other activity, such as security selling
or brokerage, which might directly or indirectly bias their investment
judgment; and second, that their remuneration for this work would
consist solely of definite, professional fees fully disclosed in advance. 41
Apart from these statements several courts have recognized the special
fiduciary relationship that exists between the investment adviser and his client.
In Ridgely v. Keene,4 2 a case decided before the enactment of the securities
laws, an adviser was held liable for non-disclosure of his remunerated influence
agreement. The client, relying on his adviser's loyalty, had bought the indicated
securities to his detriment. Under the securities laws, several cases have con44
firmed the same principle.4 3 In SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bur.,
the dissenting opinion in the Court of Appeals stated that there could not be "any
serious dispute that a relationship of trust and confidence should exist between
the adviser and the advised." 45 The Supreme Court relying heavily on the
legislative intent and history, concluded that the
Courts have imposed on a fiduciary .. .which Congress recognized
the investment adviser to be . ..an affirmative duty of utmost good
40. S. 3580, 76th Cong., 3rd Sess. § 202 (1941).
41. Hearings on S. 3580 before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Banking and
Currency, 76th Cong., 3rd Sess. 724 (1941).
42. Ridgely v. Keene, 134 App. Div. 647 119 N.Y.S. 451 (2d Dep't 1909); see also
Downs v. National Share Corp., 152 Or. 546, 55 P.2d 27 (1936); Note, Stock Scalping by
the Investment Adviser: Fraud or Legitimate Business Practice? S.E.C. v. Capital Gains
Research Bureau, 51 Calif. L. Rev. 232, 235 (1963).
43. Norris v. Hirshberg v. SEC, 117 F.2d 228 (D.C. Cir. 1949); Charles Hughes &
Co. v. SEC, 179 F.2d 434 (2d Cir. 1943); SEC v. Torr, 15 F. Supp. 315 (S.D.N.Y. 1936),
rev'd. 87 F.2d 446 (2d Cir. 1937), on removal, 22 F. supp. 602 (S.D.N.Y. 1938).
44. 307 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1962), rev'd 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
45. 306 F.2d at 808.
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faith and full and fair disclosure of all material facts as well as an
affirmative 46obligation to employ reasonable care to avoid misleading
his clients.
If it is established that investment counselors have a fiduciary duty to
their clients, the next question to be considered is whether investment advisers
of externally managed funds also have this same duty to the mutual fund
they serve.
Economically the whole mutual fund structure can be viewed as one
entity. The investors entrust their money, which will be pooled with other
people's money, to the adviser, who undertakes to manage the common portfolio.
The relation between the adviser and the mutual fund shareholder basically
parallels the ordinary investment counsel relationship. There seems to be no
reason to make a distinction by reason of the fact that the fiduciary duty is
owed to a corporation, rather than to a human being. To a certain extent,
this view would amount to a disregard of the corporate entity, although there
is no apparent reason why the fiduciary duties should be declared inexistent
by virtue of this difference alone.4 7
Another basis for the existence of fiduciary duties for the benefit of the
fund can be found in the Investment Company Act. Section 1(b) (2) declares
it against the national public interest and the interest of the investors:
When investment companies are organized, operated, managed . ..in
the interest of directors, officers, investment advisers . ..rather than
in the interest of all classes of such companies' securities holders.
This section contains the very essence of the loyalty duty: the fiduciary may
serve only the interest of the beneficiary and not anybody else. Congress thereby
wrote the general fiduciary relationship into the investment company picture and
gave only one supplementary guideline, viz., that the beneficiaries must stand
on an equal footing. These words again militate in favor of the company, rather
thani for the shareholders as assumed above. It should also be remarked that
the advisers are equally treated along with the traditional corporate fiduciaries,
namely the directors and officers.
Apart from the provisions outlawing self-dealing, which also proceeded from
the general corporate fiduciary theory, but which can, in light of the tremendous
abuses that existed prior to the enactment of the Act, be explained on more
factual grounds, attention should also be called to the powers conferred to the
SEC to bring an injunction for "gross misconduct or gross abuse of trust" against
anybody who serves "as officer, director .. .investment adviser . .."under
section 36. Again, the adviser stands on the same plane as the other fiduciaries.
This section poses special problems with regard to the extent of misconduct. It
could be argued that the narrowing of the liability to "gross misconduct" or
46. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bur., 375 U.S. 180, 194 (1963).
47. SEC v. Insurance Sec., 254 F.2d 642, 650 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 823
(1958); Lobell, Mutual Funds, A Structural Analysis, 47 Va. L. Rev. 181, 194 (1961).
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"abuse of trust" supersedes the general and much broader duty of loyalty.
However, this reading would result in a negation of almost any sense of section
1(b)(2). Further this criterion is not applicable to shareholder derivative
actions, since it applies only to injunction sought by the Commission. The real
purpose of the section was to give the Commission some guidelines in its action
against faithless investment company people, in cases where the beneficiaries
are too lenient or too confident in the loyalty of their management. Furthermore,
it was also advisable to limit the intervention of the Commission to gross violations of duties where no violation of the statute, nor of the rules and regulations
or orders was involved. 48 The conclusion would thus be that the Investment
words, did not attempt to abrogate the
Company Act, although not in express
49
previously existing law of fiduciaries.
Further, some instances can be found where the investment adviser was
held liable for breach of its fiduciary duty. However, it is often unclear whether
the court had the liability of the adviser in mind rather than the breach of
duty by the common director. The cases relating to transfer or assignment of the
advisory contract, usually occurring on transfer of a controlling block of stock
in the advisory corporation, again pose the question of liability in obscure terms.
In Lutz v. Boas"° the Delaware Chancellor Seitz held that the advisory
corporation breached its fiduciary duty by having the management function
exercised in fact by a brokerage house, remunerated by means of give-ups and
without approval of the fund or its directors. Saminsky v. Abbottul denied the
existence of fiduciary duties flowing from the adviser to prospective investors,
who were thought of as dealing on an arm's length basis. Once the deal was
entered into, the adviser assumed the duties of a trustee.
The determination that the investment advisory corporation stands in a
fiduciary relationship to the fund could have far-reaching consequences because
there is a limitation upon remuneration requested by the fiduciary. Although
the rules applicable to common law trusts are not entirely in point here, it is
generally accepted that a trustee has the right to remuneration "out of the trust
estate.1 52 The remuneration is usually fixed by statute. Moreover, for so-called
business trusts, the trustee is entitled to compensation "if it appears from the
circumstances that the parties interested intended the trustee to receive com48. Mutual Fund Report 340.
49. See Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C. § 50 (1964) see also Greene, Fiduciary

Standards of Conduct Under the Investment Company Act of 1940, 28 Geo. Wash. L. Rev.
266, 268 (1959).
50. Lutz v. Boas, 39 Del. Ch. 585, 171 A.2d 381 (1961).
51. Saminsky v. Abbott, 40 Del. Ch. 528, 185 A.2d 765 (1961); see also SEC v.
Insurance Sec., 254 F.2d 642 (9th Cir. 1958); Brown v. Bullock, 194 F. Supp. 207, 239
(S.D.N.Y. 1961); Brophy v. Cities Service Co., 31 Del. Ch. 241, 70 A.2d 5 (1949) (An

employee of an investment adviser who bad in the course of his employment obtained secret
information was held to occupy a position of trust and confidence towards his employer,
analogous in most respects to a fiduciary.).
52. Restatement of Trusts § 242 (1935).
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pensation." If no compensation is fixed, but absent opposite intention,
53
business trustee will be entitled to the compensation which is reasonable.
Therefore, and by analogy, it could be argued that the advisory corporation
has right to a "fair and reasonable" 54 compensation, whatever that means. The
analogy with the business trust is only partial: indeed, and as later stated,
the investment advisory contract appears to a large extent to be a service contract, whereby large portions of the powers of the board of directors remain
vested in the board of the fund. The application of this rule to externally
managed mutual funds would necessitate a piercing of the corporate veil, and
even then to consider the investment advisory contract as a contract whereby
a trust is established would seem rather doubtful.
On the other hand one can consider the fiduciary duty as it exists within
the corporation. As stated before, directors have a duty of loyalty to their
corporation. "Their powers are powers in trust," wrote Mr. Justice Douglas in
Pepper v. Litton,55 and:
He who is in such a fiduciary position cannot serve himself first and his
cestuis second. He cannot manipulate the affairs of the corporation to
their detriment and in disregard of the standards of common decency
and honesty. He cannot by intervention of a corporate entity violate
the ancient precept against serving two masters. He cannot by the use
of the corporate device avail himself of privileges normally permitted
outsiders in a race of creditors. . . .He cannot violate rules of fair
play by doing indirectly through the corporation what he cannot do
directly. He cannot use his power for his personal advantage and to the
detriment of the stockholders and creditors no matter how absolute in
terms that power may be and no matter how meticulous he is to satisfy
technical requirements. For that power is at all times subject to the
equitable limitation that it may not be exercised for the aggrandizement, preference, or advantage of the fiduciary to the exclusion or
detriment of the cestuis. Where there is a violation of those principles,
equity will undo the wrong or intervene to prevent its consummation." 56
If it is accepted that the investment adviser stands in a fiduciary relationship to the fund, it seems safe to assume that these dealings are subject to higher
criteria than his ordinary non-fund-related dealings. The problem is of course
to what extent this peculiar status will or should influence the management fee,
in other words the remuneration for the fiduciary activities. Assuming that the
rules applicable to a strict trust are not applicable here, there appears to be
some limitation in the dealings between the fiduciary and the cestui. It is however not clear to what extent this higher standard of conduct is applicable to
remuneration as such, as distinguished from the performance of the duties.
53.

Id. § 242, comment g.

54. A. W. Scott, Trusts, § 242.5 (2d ed. 1956).
55. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306 (1939); Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458,
164 N.E. 545 (1928) (The Court per Cordozo, J., held a partner in a joint venture to the

"finest loyalty.").
56.

Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. at 311.
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Analogy can be drawn with the situation of the lawyer, who, able and successful,
charges a higher fee than his neighbor, although performing the same services.
Assuming that the lawyer's fee is bound to certain boundaries of "reasonableness," the difficulty in appraising the value of the services is probably responsible
for the rather loose relation between compensation and services performed.
Therefore, if the limitation on management fees arising from the mere fact of
the fiduciary relationship seems rather vague, this does not exclude that other
lines of reasoning could be followed. These spring from the existence of corporate
entities. One could first think of the so-called business-judgment role.
The business judgment rule proceeds from the general obligation of directors to carry on their functions with due care and diligence. The standard of
due care includes that the decisions of the directors are open to judicial scrutiny
if it is shown that they failed to exercise the attention that could normally be
expected from an ordinary businessman. An inquiry into the appropriateness of
a certain directorial action presupposes that the action complied with all other
rules, legal requirements, fiduciary obligations, and that, of course, no fraud nor
overreaching has been committed.57 The rule makes a criterion of "due care"
applicable, which has been proven to be very difficult to delineate."8 Next, it
should also be borne in mind that the courts are very loath to interfere with
57. Barnes v. Andrews, 298 F. 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1924); Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d
667 (Sup. Ct. 1940); Bown v. Ramsdell 139 Misc. 360, 249 N.Y.S. 387 (Sup. Ct. 1931).
58. Brouck v. Managed Funds, 286 F.2d 901 (8th Cir. 1961) (At common law, directors are required to exercise due care and are not insurers.). Some counts have held that
directors of banks, investment companies, life insurance companies, trust companies are
subject to a higher standard of care, see H. Ballantine, Corporations, § 63(a), at 160 (1946),
who questions the exactness of this proposition. See also Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U.S.
132 (1890) (Ordinary attention by a bank director was held sufficient, unless he comes
across an irregularity; ordinary attention is that of an ordinarily prudent and diligent man
under similar circumstances and usages of business. The dissenting opinion (4 to 3) held
him to higher standards of care.). Also Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d 667 (banker); O'Connor
v. First Natl Investors Corp. of Va., 19 Va. 35, 177 S.E. 852 (1935) (directors of investment company). For other corporations see Sagalyn v. Meekins, Packard & Wheat, Inc.,
290 Mass. 434, 438, 195 N.E. 769, 771 (1935) (Directors cannot be held responsible for
mere errors of judgment or want of prudence in the performance of their duties; they are
bound to act with reasonable diligence.); Bown v. Ramsdell, 139 Misc. 360, 366-67, 249
N.Y.S. 387, 394 (Sup. Ct. 1931) (The same degree of care that men of ordinary prudence
would have exercised in dealing with their own property is required. They are not liable
for errors of judgment, if they act honestly and in good faith.) ; see also Everett v. Phillips,
288 N.Y. 227, 43 N.E.2d 18 (1942). (Error of judgment may be so gross that it may
demonstrate the unfitness of the director.); H. Henn Corporations § 233 at 364; Garret,
Jr. Duties and Responsibilities of CorporateDirectors 22 Bus. Law. 29 (1966) The inherent
dangers of extending the director's liability to matters of business judgment because this
would result in the reluctance of the director to accept the duties is demonstrated. The author
also refers to corporation statutes, as N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 717, where "directors and
officers shall discharge the duties of their respective positions in good faith and with that
degree of diligence, care and skill which ordinarily prudent men would exercise under
similar circumstances in like positions.) As to the origin of the prudent man rule, see Mr.
justice Putnam's statement in Harvard College v. Armory, 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) 446, (1830)
("All that he can be required of a trustee to invest is, that he shall conduct himself faithfully and exercise a sound discretion. He is to observe how men of prudence, discretion
and intelligence manage their own affairs, not in regard to speculation, hut in regard to
the permanent disposition of their funds, considering the probable income, as well as the
probable safety of the capital to be invested.").
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the determination of the appropriateness of certain directorial actions. They will
only grant relief upon a very strong showing that no man of ordinary business
judgment would have committed the action complained of (whatever that
means) .9 Therefore, it seems that this rule works rather as a defense for the
director under attack. In Convisar v. Simpson,6 ° which was a representative
action against the directors of Tri-Continental Corporation, a closed-end investment company, the directors were not held liable for retaining the capital gains
of the corporation, instead of distributing them along with the investment
income, although this would have resulted in a tax exemption under section
852(b) (3) (A) of the Internal Revenue Code, because the court accepted that
they gave "good business reasons" for the retention thereof.
In the field of management fees of investment managers, it would seem at
least extremely doubtful that an action brought under this heading would
succeed. The wide-spread use of management contracts and their similarities
will prevent the plaintiff from showing that it is so unusual in the mutual fund
sector to enter into these contracts that nobody would ever doubt about the
inappropriateness of the contract.
The business judgment rule finds its source, not in the fiduciary relationship
existing within the corporation, but in the duty of due care required of the
directors. It should therefore be distinguished from those cases which alleged
breach of trust, or of fiduciary duty whereby the business judgment rule has
often been used as a defense. There seems to be a certain overlapping between
the two fields, although they proceed from entirely different principles. Indeed,
many breaches of trust can also be characterized as a breach of the duty of due
care, while there is a vast field which comes only under one of either rules.
When courts had to decide upon activities involving a breach of the fiduciary duty of directors, which could eventually also be described as a breach
of the duty of care, they preferred to base their decision on the former approach,
which probably requires a higher standard of conduct from the director and
should logically have precedence over the duty of care approach.
Cases involving breaches of fiduciary duty can be divided in several categories. Activities such as competing with the corporation, usurping the corporate
opportunity, insider stock trading, oppression of minority stockholders and sale
of control are some of the examples where actions of corporate directors or
having some interest which conflicts with the interest of the corporation, have
traditionally been brought under the heading of breach of fiduciary duty.61 For
59. Smith v. Dunlap, 268 Ala. 97, 111 So. 2d 1 (1959); Allied Freightways, Inc. v.
Chalfin, 325 Mass. 630, 91 N.E.2d 765 (1950).
60. Conviser v. Simpson, 122 F. Supp. 205 (D. Md. 1954); New York Credit Men's
Adjustment Bur., Inc. v. Weiss, 305 N.Y. 1, 110 N.E.2d 397 (1953); Glassberg v. Boyd,
35 Del. Ch. 293 116 A.2d 711 (1955); Foster v. Bowen, 311 Mass. 359, 41 N.E.2d 181
(1942); see also Pollitz v. Wabash, R.R. 207 N.Y. 113, 100 N.E. 721 (1921); November
v. National Exhibition Co., 10 Misc. 2d 537, 173 N.Y.S.2d 490 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
61. Garret, Jr., Duties and Liabilities of Corporate Directors, Introduction General
Survey, 22 Bus. Law. 29, 34 (1966). See also Eisenberg & Lehr, An Aspect of the Emerging
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present purposes, attention will be drawn to the field of self-dealing, as defined
hereinbefore 6 2 whereby two different forms of conflicting intrests will be analyzed, viz., the case of directors voting on their own remuneration, and the case
of a contract entered into by the corporation.
Both sets of cases, as far as they constitute breaches of the duty of loyalty,
can be considered abuses of domination. This alone might constitute a breach
of trust to the extent that corporate assets are diverted from their legal destination, viz., the general interest of the corporation and of all its stockholders,
including the minority. The analogy with the common law trust is evident. There
"the trustee is under a duty to the beneficiary to administer the trust solely in
the interest of the beneficiary." 63 The trustee may not profit at the expense of
the trust estate.64 To corporate fiduciaries, more or less analogous principles
apply: they also must manage the corporation in the general interest of the
trust estate, i.e., in the interest of the corporation and its beneficiaries.
In the case of directors deciding upon their own remuneration, the conflict
situation is apparent. In order to protect a corporation against the siphoning
away of benefits to another corporation, or against looting by intercorporate
contracts, the courts were ready to view the conflict of fiduciary duties situation,
which exists when directors are sitting on the board of two corporations, with
equal rigor.65 The fact that they have applied a stricter standard in the latter
situation might find its explanation in the absence of stockholder approval as
a matter of principle, although this seems unclear.
B. Remuneration of Directors
Remuneration of directors is customarily a matter of business judgment
vested in the stockholders' discretion. But as far as allowed by state law, 0
delegation to the board of directors, through such means as charter amendments
and by-laws, is the rule rather than the exception. These situations leave wide
"Federal Corporation Law" Directional Responsibility Under the Investment Company Act
of 1940, 20 Rutgers L. Rev. 181, 226 (1965).

62. Self-dealing was strictly defined as actions involving self-interest of directors
who took part in the vote or whose presence was necessary in light of the quorum requirements. But recent decisions refuse to attach the same weight to board's approval or shareholder ratification Cf. H. Ballantine, Corporations § 72 (1946); H. Henn, Corporations
§ 239, at 374 (1961); Marsh, Jr., Are Directors Trustees?, 22 Bus. Law. 35, 43 (1966).
Therefore self-dealing might be broadened to conflicting, or self-interest.
63. Restatement of Trusts § 170(1) (1935).
64. Id. § 170, comment on (1), comment b under § 2, A. W. Scott, Trusts § 170
(2d ed. 1956).
65. "Where the director's duty of loyalty to the corporation is in conflict with his
self-interest, the court will vigorously scrutinize the situation," American Discount Corp.
v. Kavitz, 348 Mass. 706, 711, 206 N.E.2d 156, 159 (1965); Sagalyn v. Meekins, Packard
& Wheat, Inc., 290 Mass. 434, 438, 195 N.E. 175 (1935); Everett v. Phillips, 288 N.Y.

227, 232, 43 N.E.2d 18, 22 (1942) (scutiny if conflict); see also Dixmoor Golf Club v.
Evans, 325 Ill. 612, 156 N.E. 785 (1927).
66. Penn v. Robertson, 115 F.2d 167 (4th Cir. 1940), where directors had purchased
stock under a stock allotment plan, without stockholder approval, and which was held
ultra vires and void under the New Jersey statute.
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possibilities of self-dealing and abuse in all occasions where the principal beneficiaries themselves have to decide upon their own remuneration.
That on complaint of a dissatisfied stockholder an equity court can intervene is now a settled rule. Probably an allegation of gross discrepancy between
the benefits flowing to the corporation and what the director received therefor,
would be sufficient. The Supreme Court in the famous case of Rogers v. Hil 67
had occasion to set the rule. The case involved a derivative action against the
directors of American Tobacco Company. It was alleged that the profit-sharing
plan was excessive and constituted a waste of corporate assets. The plan was
approved in 1912 by a nearly unanimous vote and gave the board of directors
as a whole 10% of the net profits exceeding a certain amount. Several years
later, as business prospered, the amount rose to a sum where it was "outstripping
any reasonable relation to expense and efforts even in a legal sense." 68 . Mr.
Justice Butler, writing for the Court, said:
While the amounts produced by the application of the prescribed
percentages give rise to no inference of actual constructive fraud, the
payments under the by-law have by reason of increase in profits
become so large as to warrant investigation in equity in the interest
of the company. Much weight is to be given to the action of the stockholders and the by-law is supported by the presumption of regularity
and continuity. But the rule prescribed by it cannot, against the protest
of a shareholder, be used to justify payment of sums so large as in
substance and effect to amount to spoliation or waste of corporate
assets. The dissenting opinion of Judge Swan indicates the applicable
rule: if a bonus payment has no relation to the value of the services
for which it is given, it is in reality a gift in part and the majority of
the stockholders have no power to give away corporate property against
the protest of the minority. 69
Similarly in Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Co.,7 0 although the complaint was dismissed on jurisdictional grounds, Mr. Justice Stone, joint in his dissent by Mr.
Justice Cardozo, had occasion to reaffirm the equitable powers of the courts. In
this case a stockholder meeting had adopted a stock-option plan several years
ago. It was probably induced by a promise of additional dividends and stated
in very broad terms that the board had authority to issue stock options at a
price to be determined by the board. The board acting pursuant to this grant
of authority, voted the options at one-fourth of the current market price. This
price had not been disclosed at the annual meeting. Mr. Justice Stone, pointing
to the breach of fiduciary duty, thought that the action was ultra vires, because
the stockholders did not consent to the directors being the chief beneficiaries
of their own "unrestrained munificence."
67.
68.
(1962).
69.
70.
Packard

289 U.S. 582 (1933).
See Chancellor Seitz in Saxe v. Brady, 40 Del. Ch. 474, 494, 184 A.2d 602, 616
Rogers v. Hill, 60 F.2d 109, 113 (2d Cir. 1932), rev'd, 289 U.S. 582, 591-92 (1933).
Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Co., 288 U.S, 123 (1933); see also Sagalyn v. Meekins,
& Wheat, Inc., 290 Mass. 434, 195 N.E. 769 (1935).
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No gratuities of this kind were to be viewed as a simple employee
plan .... We need not conjecture whether, if the directors had had the
hardihood to disclose in advance the benefits which they were to award
to themselves, the stockholders would nevertheless have given their
approval. Nor is it important that these directors have successfully
managed the corporation and that under their direction it has earned
large profits for its stockholders. Their business competence did not
confer on them the privilege of making concealed or unauthorized
profits or relieve them of the elementary obligation which the law
imposes on all corporate directors to deal frankly and openly with
stockholders seeking their consent to benefit personally by reason of
71
their relationship to the corporation.
These principles have since been applied in a series of cases involving
directorial remuneration. It is therefore of the greatest importance to determine
what are the criteria the courts have applied in disqualifying a compensation
as excessive.
In Rogers v. Hill, the Court required, citing the words of Judge Swan, who
dissented in the court of appeals, that there should be "no relation to the value
for which it is given." 72 In Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Co., although relying more
on the lack of disclosure, Mr. Justice Stone found that the options were gratuities
that could not be viewed as a simple employee plan, but rather as a munificence, which can only be accomplished by unanimous stockholder consent. An
analogous, although under a certain reading somewhat stricter, standard was
applied in Gallin v. National City Bank:
We have long since passed the stage in which shareholders who merely
invest capital and leave it wholly unmanaged to the management to
make it fruitful, can make absolutely exclusive claim to all profits
against those whose labor, skill, ability, judgment and efforts have
made the profits available. The reward however must have reasonable
relation to the value of the services for which it is given and must not
be, in whole or in part, a misuse or waste of corporate funds, or a gift
to a favored few, or a scheme to distribute profits under a mere guise of
compensation, but in fact having no relation to the services rendered. 7
The legal consideration may take various forms, such as a covenant to do
something for the corporation, or a promise to remain in the service of the
corporation. But the subject matter of the consideration must have a value
reasonably related to the value of the concessions made by the corporation.74
The objecting stockholder has the burden of proving that no person of ordinary
sound business judgment would say that the consideration received by the
71.

Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Co., 288 U.S. 123, 143 (1933).

72.

Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S. 582, 591 (1933).

73.

Gallin v. National City Bank, 152 Misc. 679, 703, 273 N.Y.S. 87, 113 (Sup.

Ct. 1934).

74. Kaufman v. Schoenberg, 33 Del. Ch. 211, 91 A.2d 786 (1952); Sagalyn v. Meekins,
Packard & Wheat, Inc. 290 Mass. 434, 195 NZE. 769 (1935) (The corporation is refunded
the excess of salary above the fair value of his services.).
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corporation was a fair exchange for the options granted. 75 An analogous, rather
lax standard has been applied in the cases of Matthews v. Headly Chocolate
Co.,70 where the courts applied a standard of excessiveness, or McQuillen v.
National Cash Register,77 where the court distinguished wasteful from excessive
compensation, declaring the former unlawful, the latter not.78 And in Koplar v.
Warner Bros., a weekly salary of $10,000 plus the allotment of shares amounting
to about $12 million was said not to amount to waste of corporate assets. 79
In Massachusetts and in Delaware, there are some cases where a stricter
standard of fairness has been applied, requiring a close relation between services
obtained by the corporation and compensation paid. 80 Especially Delaware
should be distinguished because a different standard is applicable depending
upon the ratification by the stockholders, and whatever the value of this ratification. So in Gottlieb v. Heyden Chemical Corp.,81 the Deleware Supreme Court
set the rule that "where the board members vote themselves stock options and
do not obtain stockholder ratification they themselves have assumed the burden
of clearly showing their utmost good faith and most scrupulous fairness of the
bargain."
But apart from these two states, it seems to be the general rule that
directors' compensation is subject to a test of waste of assets, at least when the
action was ratified by the stockholders. Absent ratification, some courts have
held the directors to stricter fairness, although the majority does not draw this
distinction.
In fact the criterion is closely related to the ratification by the stockholders.
Stockholder approval makes the courts even more reluctant to interfere with
the activities of the corporation.
In determining whether salaries are excessive and unreasonable, so that
there should be restoration, courts proceed with some caution. . . . It
is not intended that the courts shall be called upon to make a yearly
audit and adjust salaries. The dissenting stockholders should have more
than a claim based on a mere difference of opinion upon the question
82
whether equal services could have been procured for somewhat less.
75. Kaufman v. Schoenberg, 33 Del. Ch. 211, 91 A.2d 786 (1952).
76. Matthews v. Headley Chocolate Co., 130 Md. 523, 100 A. 645 (1917).
77. McQuillen v. National Cash Register, 27 F. Supp. 639 (D.C. Md. 1939), aff'd,
112 F.2d 877 (4th Cir. 1940).
78. This is criticized in H. Ballantine, Corporations § 76, at 144, 145 (1946) on
grounds of dominating influence. Excessive compensation was in the opinion of the court
the result of poor judgment, and not necessarily the result of anything else. This was
said to destroy the private enterprise concept.
79. Koplar v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 19 F. Supp. 173 (D. Del. 1937).
80. Sagalyn v. Meekins, Packard & Wheat, Inc., 290 Mass. 434, 195 N.E. 769 (1935);
Kaufman & Schoenberg, 33 Del. Ch. 211, 91 A.2d 786 (1952); Gottlieb v. Heyden Chem.
Corp., 33 Del. ch. 82, 90 A.2d 660 (1952); Frankel v. Donovan, 35 Del: Ch. 433, 120
A.2d 311 (1956); Forman v. Chesler, 39 Del. Ch. 484, 167 A.2d 442 (1961).
81. Gottlieb v. Heyden Chem. Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 82, 90 A.2d 660, reargument denied
in part, 33 Del. Ch. 177, 91 A.2d 57 (1952), claim denied, 34 Del. Ch. 84, 99 A.2d 507 (1953)
(Plaintiff did not meet the burden of proof.).
82. Seitz v. Union Brass & Metal Mfg. Co., 152 Minn. 460, 189 N.W. 587 (1922).
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And the language of the court in Heller v. Boylan is even stronger: "To act out
of whimsy or caprice or arbitrariness would be more than inexact, it would be
the precise antithesis of justice, it would be a farce."8 3 Courts, understandably
enough, dislike to interfere with the management of corporations, at least if the
corporation is honestly and fairly run.8 4 They are of the opinion that management compensation is a matter of stockholder discretion, or, mostly, of the
board's discretion, and therefore refrain from putting their "business judgment"
in lieu of that of the majority of the stockholders. This however does not preclude them from evaluating the transaction if it appears that the illegalities,
fraud, bad faith or the like have been committed, even if the plan was ratified
by a clear majority. "Where waste or misuse or abuse of trust has been
committed," said the court in Heller v. Boylan, "this cannot be left without
impunity.18 5 But courts often prefer to evade the question by pointing out how
ill-equipped they are or how subjective the question of adequate reasonable
compensation can be.
In order to warrant investigation by the court, in disregard of majority
ratification, plaintiff must bring his action within one of the aforementioned
86
forms of misconduct.
It could be argued that compensation, even ratified by the stockholders,
but amounting to waste of corporate issets, works as a "fraud" upon the corporation. And also breaches of fiduciary duty thusly committed would be deemed
sufficient to enable court's intervention. If the conduct is so blatant that no
reasonable man would ever have assented to the transaction had he known it in
its full details, courts disregard the ratification, saying that, if the stockholders
had not been aware of the real significance they would not, or even could
87
not have ratified.
Keenan v. Eshlenan88 was a case of double compensation, i.e., compensation
paid by the parent and its subsidiary for the same services, where the court
83.

Heller v. Boylan, 29 N.Y.S.2d

653 (Sup. Ct.), afl'd, 263 App. Div. 815, 32

N.Y.S.2d 137 (1st Dep't 1941); see also Gottlieb v. Heyden Chem. Corp. 33 Del. Ch. 82,

90 A.2d 660 (1952).
84. McQuillen v. National Cash Register, 27 F. Supp. 639 (D.C. Md. 1939), aJJ'd,
112 F.2d 877 (4th Cir. 1940); Ashman v. Miller, 101 F.2d 85 (6th Cir. 1939) (Unless breach

of trust or equivalent misconduct, courts refuse to intervene.); United Milk Prod. v.
Lovell, 75 F.2d 923 (6th Cir. 1935).
85. Heller v. Boylan, 29 N.S.2d 653 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 263 App. Div. 815, 32 N.Y.S.2d
137 (1st Dep't 1941).
86. Gallin v. National City Bank, 152 Misc. 679, 273 N.Y. 87 (Sup. Ct. 1934), before
the referee, 155 Misc. 880, 281 N.Y.S. 795 (Sup. Ct. 1935).
87. Mayer v. Adams, 34 Del. Ch. 298, 141 A.2d 458 (1958); Rogers v. Guaranty Trust
Co., 288 U.S. 123, 133 (1933) (Stone, J., dissenting), but even assuming that the stockholders were duly aware of all the facts and had cast an independent and disinterested vote,
it could be argued that this would not suffice to bar the court's action as being a gift of
corporate assets. See Mr. Justice Cardozo, in same case. "Consent will not protect if reason
and moderation are made to mark the boundaries of what is done under its shelter." Id. at
150.

88. Xeenan v. Eshleman, 23 Del. Ch. 234, 2 A.2d 904 (1938).
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held that the double compensation was a fraudulent misapplication of corporate
funds and hence warranted a waiver of the ratification defense.
Claman v. Robertson"9 involved the issuance of stock options, ratified by
the majority, at 1/6th of the market price. The court found no prima facie
fraud and upheld the ratification defense.
In Delaware three decisions have dealt with this problem. Kerbs v. California EasternAirways ° involved a stock option and profit sharing plan, adopted
by the board. Five out of eight members of the board were beneficiaries under
the plan. The action was duly ratified by the stockholders. The court, deciding
upon validity of the action, invalidated it because of the presence of the interested directors, although it heavily stressed the fact that the benefits were
bestowed as well during as for six months after termination of employment. The
last feature was said to be a lack of consideration, which caused the plan to
have "no reasonable relationship between the value of the options granted as
an inducement or compensation and the value of the services to be rendered by
the employee." 91
A similar action was brought in Gottlieb v. Heyden Chemical Corp. Here
the plan was unanimously approved by the board and subsequently ratified by
the shareholders. The court refused to invalidate the action but remanded the
case for trial on the question of excessiveness. The defendants had invoked their
business judgment concerning the question of consideration. The court, aware
of their adverse interest, refused the application of the rule.
Human nature being what it is, the law, in its wisdom does not presume
of their
that directors will be competent judges of the fair treatment
92
company where fairness must be at their own expense.
The ratification defense was also waived, for, said the court, its purpose in many
instances is "to permit the action of the board of directors to be reviewed on
its merits, without the handicap of enforced suspicion, which could otherwise
be present where the board members have represented themselves as well as
their corporation." But unless ratification is unanimous, "it can never constitute
the only requisite to validity. An unconscionable deal between directors personally and the corporation they represent could not become conscionable merely
because most of the stockholders were either indifferent or actually in sympathy
with the directors. Certainly a gift to themselves or to their business associates
will not avail against the vote of any qualified objector."
On reargument, which was denied in part, the court had occasion to
reaffirm its view on the content of fairness in case of ratification:
89. Claman v. Robertson, 164 Ohio St. 61, 128 N.E.2d 429 (1955) This case is a

reminder that in courts of first impression, acceptance or rejection of the non-ratification
rule may turn upon the egregiousness of the alleged wrong.
90. See Kerbs v. California Eastern Airways, 33 Del. Ch. 69 90 A.2d 652 (1952).
91. Id. at 74, 90 A.2d at 656.
92. Gottlieb v. Heyden Chem. Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 82, 90 A.2d 60 (1952).
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If this stockholder can show the Chancellor that the value of the
options covered by the contracts is so much greater than the value of
retaining these men . . . that no reasonable businessman, fully informed as to the respective values and acting in good faith could be
expected to consider the bargain attractive to the corporation, than it
would be shocking to preclude (the stockholder) from his right to
prove it.v3
These opinions were affirmed and reviewed in another case, Beard v.
Elster. 4 Here stock options were adopted by a wholly independent board and

allocated by a board committee which was by no means interested. On plaintiff's allegation of gift of corporate assets, the court pointed to the business
judgment rule, in that in absence of adverse interests, it was up to them, and
to them only, to determine what and how it was going to be conferred.
From the foregoing it would appear that the ratification defense will be
disregarded by the court if the plaintiff succeeds in convincing the court that
illegalities, "fraud," or bad faith have been committed. 95 The final burden of
proving the content of fairness, if the transaction was ratified by the stockholders, would fall upon plaintiff. He would have to prove gross unfairness.0 0
If the action was not ratified, the defendant director would have to prove that
there was no gross unfairness, or in other words that the corporation received
some consideration . 7 But in some states, viz., Massachusetts and Delaware, he
would have to prove that the deal was entered into in utmost fairness, or in
utmost good faith, and represents all characteristics of arm's length bargaining. This difference in burden of proof can be criticized as not very logical
because the solution where the court has agreed to disregard the ratification
should be identical to the solution in absence of ratification.
93. 33 Del. Ch. 82, 91 A.2d 57, 59 (1952).
94. Beard v. Elster, 39 Del. Ch. 153, 160 A.2d 731 (1960).
95. Kerbs v. California Eastern Airways, 33 Del. Ch. 69, 90 A.2d 652 (1952); See also
Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S. 592 (1933); Blish v. Thompson Automatic Arms Corp., 30 Del. Ch.
538, 64 A.2d 581 (1948); Keenan v. Eshleman, 23 Del. Ch. 234, 2 A.2d 904 (1938); Gallin
v. National City Bank, 152 Misc. 679, 273 N.Y.S. 87 (Sup. Ct. 1934) ; cf. Holthusen v. Edward G. Budd Mfg. Co., 52 F. Supp. 125 (D.C. Pa. 1943); Smith v. Dunlap, 269 Ala. 97,
111 So. 2d 1 (1959) (bad faith, gift of corporate assets) ; Russell v. Patterson Co., 232 Pa.
113, 81 A. 136, (1911) (Ratification is possible where the action of the board of directors
is not fraudulent or unfair to the extent of amounting to fraud.); but see Von Arnim v.
American Tube works, 188 Mass. 515, 74 N.E. 680 (1905) (fraud or illegality).
96. Kaufman v. Schoenberg, 33 Del. Ch. 211, 91 A.2d 786 (1952) ; Gottlieb v. Heyden
Chem. Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 82 90 A.2d 660 (1952); Saxe v. Brady, 40 Del. Ch. 474, 184 A.2d
602 (1962); Davids v. Davids, 135 App. Div. 206, 120 N.Y.S. 350 (1st Dep't 1909); Car v.
Kimball, 153 App. Div. 825, 139 N.Y.S. 253 (1st Dep't 1912); On these subjects see generally
Note, The Nonratification Rule and the Demand Requirement: The Case for Limited
Judicial Review, 63 Colum. L. Rev. 1085 (1963); Eisenberg & Lehr, An Aspect of the
Emerging "Federal Corporation Law": Directorial Responsibility Under the Investment
Company Act of 1940, 20 Rutgers L. Rev. 181 (1965).
97. Heller v. Boylan, 29 N.Y.S.2d 653, 670 Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 263 App. Div. 815, 32
N.Y.S.2d 131 (1st Dep't 1941); see also Jones v. Missouri-Edison Elec. Co., 144 F. 765 (8th
Cir. 1906); Kaufman v. Schoenberg, 33 Del. Ch. 211, 91 A.2d 786 (1952); Gottlieb v.
Heyden Chem. Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 82, 90 A.2d 660 (1952); cf. Smith v. Dunlap, 269 Ala. 97,
111 So. 2d 1 (1959) (excessiveness of compensation or bad faith has to be shown).
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Plaintiff, apart from the ratification defense, will also encounter resistance
from the fact that the board, to which the discretion in these matters is often
delegated, will invoke its approval as being within its business judgment.98 Courts
have also been willing to disregard this defense, at least in cases where the
directors had a conflicting interest 99 or were dominated by an interested director. 00 This however has not been held to change the content of fairness nor
to shift the burden of proof.
Stockholders bringing an action against the directors of their corporation
for excessive compensation will therefore have to allege self-interest or domination or bad faith in order to overcome the defense of the board's approval,
illegality, bad faith or "fraud" when the action was ratified by the stockholders,
and finally prove that the compensation amounted to a waste of corporate
assets. This would be the pattern to be followed by the mutual fund shareholder
who is dissatisfied with the payments under the management contract and in
as far as these payments can be considered as remuneration, which has been
the case.' 0
C. Contractswith Another Corporationwith Interlocking Directorship
An analogous set of facts can be found in the situation where directors
negotiate contracts with two corporations, while they are members of the boards
of both corporations. These dealings can be distinguished from the foregoing
cases of remuneration, in that the remedies might be different. These contracts
almost per se create a conflict of interest situation. Often courts, considering the
problem, were aware of these conflicting interests. On the one hand, there was
a strong fear that the transaction was entered into only for the personal interest
of the director, or the corporation in which he had the largest stake. On the
other hand, it was also apparent that, as interlocking directorships cannot be
avoided in today's corporate life, it is often unfeasible to void these contracts
simply because there was conflict of interest, since the contracts were often
profitable to both corporations. Therefore, and refusing to apply a hard-and-fast
rule, as the English courts do, the American courts devised means to test the
equity of these transactions. It should also be remarked from the outset that
these contracts are nowadays subject to the same rules as are contracts between
the corporation and one of its directors.
The Supreme Court, in Twin-Lick Oil Co. v. Marbury, held that a loan by
98. Smith v. Dunlap, 269 Ala. 97, 111 So. 2d 1 (1959).
99. Walsh v. Van Ameringen-Haebler, Inc., 257 N.Y. 478, 178 N.E. 764 (1931);
Osbrin v. Celanese Corp. of Am., 291 N.Y. 170, 51 N.E.2d 694 (1943); but see Brilliant
v. Long Island Waste Corp., 23 Misc. 2d 788, 192 N.Y.S.2d 797 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
100. Globe Woolen v. Utica Gas & EIec. Co., 224 N.Y. 483, 121 N.E. 378 (1918);
Haberman v. New York Ambassador, Inc., 272 App. Div. 375, 71 N.Y.S.2d 196 (1st Dep't
1947); see also Shlensky v. South Parkway Corp., 19 Ill.
2d 268, 166 N.E.2d 793 (1960);
see generally Eisenberg & Lehr, supra note 96, at 230-32.
101. See e.g., Saxe v. Brady, 40 Del. Ch. 474, 184 A.2d 602 (1962); see also Acampora
v. Birkland, 220 F. Supp. 527 (D. Colo. 1963).
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a director to his corporation would stand if it was fair and free from blame.
The old hard-and-fast rule:
while it would afford little protection to the corporation against actual
fraud and oppression, would deprive it of the aid of the most interested
of
in giving aid judiciously and best qualified to judge the necessity
10 2
that aid, and of the extent to which it may safely be given.
Therefore, courts took into account such ingredients as the ratification by
the shareholders, the directors who had taken part in the formal corporate action
and the inherent fairness of the transaction. In earlier decisions, the transaction
was upheld if it was formally voted upon by the independent directors who
were meeting with the required quorum and of which at least the majority were
in favor of the transaction. But as some cases came up where this test would
afford little protection to the corporation, e.g., where the board was heavily
dominated by an influent director, ° 3 or where the presence of the adversely
interested director was required to obtain a quorum, it soon became obvious
that the independent quorum and majority requirements would have to be
coupled with a test of fairness. In the latter possibility courts preferred to
declare the transaction void, at the request of the corporation, regardless of any
consideration of fairness: °4 But as this solution also caused unjust results, the
fairness test replaced all other elements. In more recent cases, although the
former elements are often cited, the trend and the impact seem to go growingly
to the fairness test exclusively.' 0 5
It should be remarked that cases where the majority of the board is interlocking, as well as cases where only one, but then the dominating director is
common, come under the applicability of the rule.'0
In Corsicana Nat'l Bank v. Johnson, Mr. Justice Pitney had this to say
about the conflicting duties:
The fact that the same persons were directors and managers of both
corporations subjects their dealings inter sese to close scrutiny. That
two companies have a majority or even the whole membership of their
boards of directors in common does not necessarily render transactions
102. Twin-Lick Oil Co. v, Marbury, 91 U.S. 587, 589 (1875).
103. Globe Woolen v. Utica Gas & Elec. Co., 224 N.Y. 4832 121 N.E. 378 (1918); Note,
83 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 56, 59 (1934).
104. Rowland v. Kable, 174 Va. 343, 6 S.E.2d 633, 643 (1940); Central Land Co. v.
Obenchain, 92 Va. 130, 22 S.E. 876 (1895) ; Ferguson v. Gooch, 94 Va. 1, 26 S.E. 397 (1896) ;
Beury v. Davis, 11 Va. 581, 69 S.E. 1050 (1910); Cardozo v. Middle Atlantic & C. Co.,
116 Va. 342, 82 S.E. 80 (1914); Williams v. Balling, 138 Va. 244, 121 S.E. 270 (1923);
see also Cumberland Coal & Iron Co. v. Sherman, 30 Barb. 553 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1859);
Klopot v. Northrop, 131 Conn. 14, 37 A.2d 700 (1944); Thomas v. Brownville & Co. R.R.,
109 U.S. 522 (1883); Wardell v. Railroad Co., 103 U.S. 651 (1880).
105. Crocker v. Cumberland Mining & Milling Co., 31 S.D. 137, 139 N.W. 783
(1913); see also Richland v. Crandall, 262 F. Supp. 538 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (2 out of 16
directors were common); Mardell Sec,, Inc. v. Alexandria Gazette Corp., 183 F. Supp. 7
(D. Va. 1960).

106. Note, The fairness Test of CorporateContracts with Interested Directors, 61 Harv.
L. Rev. 335 (1948); Marsh, Jr., Are Directors Trustees?, 22 Bus. Law. 35 (1966).
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between them void; but transactions resulting from the agency of officers or directors acting at the same time for both must be deemed
presumptively fraudulent unless expressly authorized or ratified by the
stockholders; and certainly, where circumstances show that the transaction would be of great advantage to one corporation at the expense
of the other, especially where in addition to this the personal interests
of the directors or any of them would be enhanced at the expense of
stockholders within
the stockholders, the transaction is voidable by10the
7
a reasonable time after discovery of the fraud.
In Corsicana the directorates were clearly interlocking. But in Geddes v.
Anaconda Copper Mining Co., decided the year after. Corsicana, the Supreme
Court subjected intercorporate dealings to the fairness test even if no majority
was common to both corporations: "Especially is this true (namely that the
transaction must be fair) where a common director is dominating in influence
or in character.'" 08
And as to the dominating influence of a director, the opinion of Judge
Cardozo in Globe Woolen Co. v. Utica Gas & Elec. Co. is revealing. There a
director was held liable for breach of fiduciary duty in making a harsh
contract between a corporation in which he was interested and another corporation of which he was also a director. When the matter came before the executive
committee of the defendant corporation he kept silent and excused himself
from voting. Judge Cardozo said:
But the argument is that by refusing to vote he shifted the responsibility to his associates and may reap a profit from their errors. One
does not divest oneself so readily of one's duties as a trustee. A dominating influence may be exercised in other ways than by a vote. He
cannot rid himself of his duty to warn or denounce if there is improvidence or oppression. A constant duty rests on a trustee to seek no harsh
advantage to the detriment of his duty.10 9
Of course the main problem is to define what is a fair deal. Certainly it
should be stressed that in considering the fairness of transactions, all elements
that enter into play should be taken into account."i 0 However, there seems to
be a largely accepted criterion which was defined in the following question:
"Would an independent corporate fiduciary in an arm's length bargain bind his
corporation to such a transaction?""' The application of this criterion has
sometimes been criticized, since it requires appraising the transaction at a
moment in time when the circumstances that led to the transaction have already
107. Corsicana Nat'l Bank v. Iohnson, 251 U.S. 68, 90 (1919); Geddes v. Anaconda
Copper Mining Co., 254 U.S. 590, 599 (1920).
108. 251 U.S. at 90.
109. Globe Woolen v. Utica Gas & Elec. Co., 224 483, 121 N.E. 378 (1918); see also
Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d 667 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
110. Winchell v. Plywood Corp., 324 Mass. 171, 179, 85 N.E.2d 313, 318 (1949).
111. H. Henn Corporations § 239, at 374 (1961); Note, Transfer of Management Company Control Upheld Despite Allegation of Domination Over Mutual Fund
Directors, 63 Colum. L. Rev. 153 (1963).
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disappeared. In order to avoid hindsight, it was therefore proposed that the
question should be read as: "Would reasonable and disinterested directors have
2
conducted themselves as did the particular directors?""1
Whatever it may be, it seems that the fairness test as applied in this field
could be compared with the fairness test in the compensation cases, although
most courts held the directors to higher duties, to "utmost fairness," when they
had interests at both sides of such contracts. In a case involving the sale of a
large part of the assets of a corporation to another corporation in which one
director was adversely interested, being president and director of both corporations, the Supreme Court directed that the sale should be set aside on the ground
that the consideration was not fully adequate. 13 In the recent case of Richland
v. Crandall,1" 4 where a corporation had sold all its assets to another corporation
in which some of its directors were adversely interested, the suit of a minority
shareholder, suing after ratification of the transaction, was dismissed by the
court under a reading of the fairness test as whether "the price (was) so far
below the actual value of the property and unconscionably and unreasonably
low that it would shock the conscience." 11 However, in the determination of
fairness relied on in this case, the court followed the rule laid down in three
earlier cases, where, absent any element of fiduciary relationship, it was held
that equity may set aside conveyances which evidence a lack of consideration,
or where consideration was merely nominal. 110
In Globe Woolen Co. v. Utica Gas & Elec. Co., 1 7 it was said that there
must be candor and equity in the transaction and some reasonable proportion
between benefits and burdens; but there of course it was sufficient to require
this lower standard of conduct to avoid the contract, due to the extreme harshness of the agreement, which the court found clearly unfair.
In another case involving the sale of land, the promoters of an incorporated
golf club had caused a tract of land to be conveyed through their intervention,
although they merely held an option to the land. The price was more than twice
the option price. The court held them to utmost fairness and found them liable
8
for the inadequacy of consideration."1
The old Supreme Court case of Twin-Lick Oil Co. v. Marbury"1 9 involved
a loan by a director to his corporation. The Court subjected the transaction to
112. But see Note, The Fairness Test of Corporate Contracts with Interested Directors,
61 Harv. L. Rev. 335, 340-41 (1948).
113. Geddes v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co., 254 U.S. 590 (1920); United Towing
Co. v. H. A. Phillips, 242 F.2d 627 (5th Cir. 1957) (encumbrance).
114. Richland v. Crandall, 262 F. Supp. 538 (SID.N.Y. 1967).
115. Id. at 546.
116. See, e.g., Clark v. Trust Co., 100 U.S. 149 (1879); Mandel v. Liebman, 303 N.Y.
88, 100 N.E.2d 149 (1951).
117. Globe Woolen Co. v. Utica Gas & Elec. Co., 224 N.Y. 483, 121 N.E. 378 (1918).
118. Dixmoor Golf Club v. Evans, 325 Ill. 612, 156 N.E. 785 (1927).
119. Twin-Lick Oil Co. v. Marbury, 91 U.S. 587 (1875) also involved the purchase
by a director of corporate property at a fair public sale, by a trustee under a deed of trust,

executed to secure the payment of lended money. The sale was held valid.
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a criterion of fairness, whereby it was stressed that the fiduciary situation of
the director imposed on him an obligation of "candor and fair dealing," which
obligation "is increased in the precise degree that this representative character
had given him power and control derived from the confidence reposed in him by
the stockholders who appointed him their agent.'12°
A lease which was executed and recorded immediately after the meeting of
the board where the matter was brought up without prior notices, was declared
void under the "test of undivided loyalty," viz. "whether the corporate action
is the result of the exercise by the directors of their unbiased judgment in
determining that such action will promote the corporate interests."'121 But an
unbiased judgment was exercised when the directors made an innocent mistake
in approving a contract for the delivery of commodities. 122 It should be stressed
that often the fairness requirement is interwoven with considerations of bad
23
faith, which by-passes this problem.'
How flexible this standard of conduct is, can best be illustrated by an excerpt
from Shlensky v. South Parkway Bldg. Corp.:
While the concept of fairness is incapable of precise definition, courts
have stressed such factors as whether the corporation received in the
transaction full value in all the commodities purchased; the corporation's needs for the property; its ability to finance the purchase;
whether the transaction was at the market price, or below, or constituted a better bargain than the corporation could have otherwise
obtained in dealings with others; whether there was a possibility of
corporate gain siphoned off by the directors directly or through corporations they controlled; and whether there was full disclosure although
shareholder assent can convert dishonest transneither disclosure nor 124
action into a fair one.
In connection with this rather high standard of conduct expected from
corporate directors in dealing with their corporation or in dealings with other
corporations in which they are adversely interested, the question of stockholder
ratification is of the highest importance. The question is the more important
because courts have consistently held that these dealings are voidable rather
than void. First it should be stressed that full and frank disclosure is a prerequisite for any ratification. 2 5 Generally this conduct can be said to be ratifiable 126 unless the plaintiff alleges-and his allegations must be reasonable and
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
793, 801,
125.
213 A.2d
126.
Winchell

Id. at 590.
Lippel v. Hirsh, 119 N.Y.S.2d 453, 455 (Sup. Ct. 1953).
Chelrob v. Barret, 293 N.Y. 442 57 N.E.2d 825 (1944).
Everett v. Phillips, 288 N.Y. 227, 43 N.E.2d 18 (1942).
Shlensky v. South Parkway Bldg. Corp., 19 II. 2d 268, 278, 279, 166 N.E.2d
802 (1960).
Arrigani v. Adorno, 129 Conn. 673, 31 A.2d 32 (1943); Goodman v. Futrovsky,
899 (Del. 1965).
George H. Gilbert Mfg. Co. v. Goldfine, 317 Mass. 681, 59 N.E.2d 461 (1945);
v. Plywood Co., 324 Mass 171, 85 N.E.2d 313 (1949).
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consistent-that illegalities have been committed, or that the adversely interested
directors were in a dominating position.12 7 In these cases courts have been
willing to disregard the ratification. But also where gift of corporate assets is
alleged, or where fraudulent conduct is complained of, courts have waived the
stockholder absolution. Of course, the plaintiff has the burden of proving the
circumstances which warrant the disregard of ratification. This is usually done
in the general allegations, including contentions on the merits. In these cases
the courts will look closely at the equities of the attacked transaction and, as
it appeared from foregoing analysis, will test the activity against a high standard
of conduct. Moreover, in absence of ratification, the same standard of conduct
would apply: then these actions are sometimes said to be "presumptively fraud8
ulent.,,12
In Pollitz v. Wabash R.R., 129 a case involving an elaborate plan of issuance
of stock against worthless stock of another railroad for the benefit of the directors, an allegation of fraud was found dispositive of the ratification defense,
although there could have been doubt about proper disclosure.
The transaction presented by the complaint could not be ratified by a
mere majority of stockholders because it was fraudulent. The direct or
indirect misappropriation of assets of the corporation to his own benefit
by an officer is incapable of being authorized by a vote or any act or
omission of the majority of the stockholders. 1 0
Gottlieb v. McKee 131 involved a diversion of corporate opportunity which
was allegedly ratified by the stockholders. But the court found that it was a
gift of corporate assets and that hence the ratification constituted "nothing."
Rogers v. American Can Co.,182 although alleging a violation of the antitrust
laws, disposed of the ratification defense by accepting plaintiff's contention that
the directors controlled the proxy machinery and hence were dominating. Many
other cases can be found where domination was held sufficient by the court to
183
inquire into the corporation action, notwithstanding ratification.
Once the court has, under any of the foregoing grounds, set aside the
ratification defense, the burden of proof shifts to the defendant-director, who
127. Geddes v. Anaconda Copper & Mining Co., 254 U.S. 590 (1920); Keenan v.
Eshleman, 23 Del. Ch. 234 2 A.2d 904 (1938); Buckman v. Elm Hill Realty Co. of Peabody,
42 N.E.2d 814, 312 Mass. 10 (1942) ; (vitiation of board's approval); see also Field v. Western Life Indemnity Co., 166 F. 607 (7th Cir. 1908); Loft, Inc. v. Guth, 23 Del. Ch. 138,
2 A.2d 225 (1938).

128. Corsicana Natl Bank v. Johnson, 251 U.S. 68 (1919); Mardell Sec., Inc. v.
Alexandria Gazette Corp., 183 F. Supp. 7 (D. Va. 1960).
129.
130.

131.
132.
133.
Eshleman,

Pollitz v. Wabash R.R., 207 N.Y. 113, 100 N.E. 721 (1912).
Id. at 126-27; 100 N.E. at 724-25.

Gottlieb v. McKee, 34 Del. Ch. 539, 107 A.2d 240 (1954).
Rogers v. American Can Co., 305 F.2d 297 (3d Cir. 1967).
Geddes v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co., 254 U.S. 590 (1920); Keenan v.
23 Del. Ch. 234 2 A.2d 904 (1938); Buckman v. Elm Hill Realty Co. of Peabody,

312 Mass. 10, 42 N.E.2d 814 (1942); see also Loft Inc. v. Guth, 23 Del. Ch. 138, 2 A.2d 225

(1938).
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will have to prove his utmost good faith and the inherent fairness 4 of the
transaction.' 3" A long line of decisions point in that direction.
Sometimes courts found themselves before directorates that asserted the
defense that a special action was taken against litigation on the issue involved,
and that the stockholders had voted on a resolution whereby the company
refused to sue its director. At least one case has upheld this defense, and
another refused, saying that this would not avail the director if the resolution
was induced by bad faith or domination. 3 6
Due to the inherent conflict of interest, the issue of the board's approval,
which arises in this context as well as under the directorial remuneration cases,
has not been expressly decided upon in cases of this order. But it is fair to
assume that the allegation of domination would dispose of the approval defense
137
here as well.
D. State Business Corporation Statutes
Although the previous analysis constituted only an attempt to inquire into
the prevailing common law rules governing the matter herein discussed, it should
be concluded by study of the state corporation laws. The first state to adopt
regulation in this field was California. 138 More recently states like New York,
North Carolina and South Carolina also have adopted provisions regarding
"self-dealing." Generally the pattern is that the transaction will stand, or, in
the terms of section 713 of the New York Business Corporation Law, that the
transaction "shall [not] be void or voidable of [the] reason alone" of the conflicting interests, when any of the following conditions are met: a) the adverse
interests were fully disclosed and the transaction approved by the board not
counting the votes of the interested directors, or ratified by the shareholders;
b) the transaction was "fair and reasonable" (under the New York Statute) or
"just and reasonable" (under section 820 of the California Corporation Law).
Many other states have different provisions, which diverge to a certain
extent: Illinois provides that, "irrespective of any personal interest" the board
134. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306 (1939); Foster v. Bowen, 311 Mass. 359,
41 N.E.2d 181 (1942); Buckman v. Elm Hill Realty Co. of Peabody, 312 Mass. 10, 42 N.E.2d
814 (1947); Winchell v. Plywood Co., 324 Mass. 171, 8 N.E.2d 313 (1949); see also
Twin-Lick Oil Co. v. Marbury, 91 U.S. 587 (1875); Cummings v. United Artists Theatre
Cir. Inc. 237 Md. 1., 204 A.2d 795 (1964); Minnesota Loan & Trust Co. v. Peteler Car
Co., 132 Minn. 277, 156 N.W. 255 (1916); cf. Geddes v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co.,
254 U.S. 590 (1920) ("entire fairness").
135. Burden of Proof on director: Cathedral Estates v. Taft Realty Co., 288 F.2d
85 (2d Cir. 1955); Mardell Sec., Inc. v. Alexandria Gazette Corp., 183 F. Supp. 7 (D. Va.
1960); see also Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939); Shlensky v. South Parkway Bldg.
Corp. 19 IMI.2d 268, 166 N.E.2d 793 (1960) (The approval of an independent board was
suggested to have the same effect.); Winger v. Chicago City Bank & Trust Co., 394 Ill. 94,
67 N.E.2d 265 (1946); cf. Everett v. Phillips, 288 N.Y. 227, 43 N.E.2d 18 (1942).
136. See S. Solomont & Sons Trust, Inc. v. New England Theatre Operating Co., 326
Mass. 99, 93 N.E.2d 241 (1950); see also Levitt v. Johnson, 222 F. Supp. 805 (D. Mass.
1963), rev'd on other grounds, 334 F.2d 815 (1st Cir. 1964).

137. See text accompanying supra note 101.
138. Cal. Corp. Code § 820 (1955).
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shall have authority to fix "reasonable compensation." And Connecticut shifts
the content of fairness from "manifestly unfair" to merely "unfair" whether or
not the action was approved by a disinterested board. Other statutes provide
for voting disqualification of the interested director,'13 9 while Massachusetts and
140
Rhode Island come closer to the California statute.
It is very important to note that Delaware has no similar disposition yet,
not only because it is the most important corporate state, but also because
mutual funds on many occasions have elected that state for their incorporation.
However it is most important to determine the effects of the California
type statute. To begin with the conclusion of Professor Harold Marsh, Jr. on this
matter, in his very able article entitled, Are Directors Trustees?
Under statute, judicial decision or character provision, it would be a
rarity today to find a transaction involving interested directors which
was not permitted by law, subject only to possible invalidation for
unfairness. 141
Only a few cases under California law have been decided on that issue.
Remillard Brick Co. v. Remillard Dandini Co. involved a scheme whereby two
directors controlled a "company and its wholly owned subsidiary through the
proxies of the majority, though disinterested, stockholders. They secured a
contract whereby the whole output of the two companies was going to be sold
to a third company, wholly owned by the directors, at a price guaranteed by
the third company. On suit by the minority shareholder of the parent, controlled
company, the court, notwithstanding the fact that the contract was approved
by the board and ratified by the shareholders, set the contract aside. The trial
court had not found the contract "just, fair and equitable"; it was said to work
as a fraud upon the minority shareholder. The court of appeal affirmed stating:
If conniving directors simply disclose their dereliction to the powerless
minority, any transaction by which
42 the majority desires to mulct the
minority is immune from attack.
They emphasized that that could not be the law of California.
This section does not operate to limit the fiduciary duties owed by a
director to all stockholders nor does it operate to condone acts which,
without the existence of a common directorship would not be countenanced. That section does not permit an officer or director, by abuse
of his power, to obtain an unfair
advantage or profit for himself at the
43
expense of the corporation.1
In Kennerson v. Burbank Amusement Corp.,1 44 a management company,
139. See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 33-323 (1958).
140. See, e.g., R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 7-4-7 (1956).
141. Harold Marsh, Jr., Are DirectorsTrustees? 22 Bus. Law. 35, 48 (1967).
142. Remillard Brick Co. v. Remillard-Dondini Co., 109 Cal. App. 2d 405, 417, 241
P.2d 66, 73 (1952).
143. Id. at 419, 241 P.2d at 74.
144. Kennerson v. Burbonh Amusement Co., 120 Cal. App. 2d 157, 260 P.2d 823 (1953).
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whose only assets were a management contract and some theatre fixtures,
entered into the contract with another corporation having some directors in
common. The court invalidated the agreement notwithstanding the fact that
the formal requirement of the board's approval was met. Referring to the
Remillard case, it repeated that "even though the requirements of section 820
are technically met, transactions that are unfair and unreasonable to the
corporation may be avoided." 145 Disclosure and approval did not validate for
where the transaction greatly benefits one corporation at the expense of
another, and especially if it personally benefits the majority directors,
it will and should be set aside. In other words, while the transaction is
not voidable simply because an interested director participated, it will
not be upheld if it is unfair to the minority stockholder .... 1-6
The court said that as the delegation itself, which constituted the breach of
fiduciary duty, was void under prevailing law and the contract could not be
approved. It should be noted that in both cases the courts heavily relied on
Pepper v. Litton, the 1919 Supreme Court case, where it was said that "the
essence of the test is whether . . . under all circumstances the transaction carries
the earmarks of an arm's length bargain. If it does not, equity will set it
47
aside."'
Under New York Corporation Law the same problem will arise. Because of
the recent origin of this section, however, no decisions are yet available or
widely known. The commentary in McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York
proposes a similar reading of the section, which could not
provide a basis for validating for all purposes a contract or transaction
between an interested director and his corporation . . . (it simply
establishes) that such contract or transaction is not automatically void
or voidable by reason alone of the director's interest. A director who
does not make a full and fair disclosure of his interest, or members of
the board who breach their fiduciary duty as defined in S. 717 in
approving such contract or transaction may be held responsible for
such conduct despite a technical compliance with the section.' 48
As these few citations demonstrate, the purpose of these statutes is not so
much to wipe out the existing fairness test, but rather to put an end to the
existing, inconsequent position taken in some cases as Everett v. Phillips'49 and
the older case of Munson v. Syracuse, Geneva & Corning R.R.,150 where it was
said that the mere existence of an adverse interest was sufficient to invalidate
the transaction. Therefore, one may conclude that if the state corporation laws
have strengthened the approval or ratification defenses, they do not intend to
145. Id. at 171, 260 P.2d at 831.
146. Id.
147. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 299 at 306 (1919).
148. Hornstein, Practice Commentary, 6 McKinney's Consol. Laws (App. I).
149. Everett v. Phillips, 288 N.Y. 227, 43 N.E.2d 18 (1942).
150. Munson v. Syracuse, G. & C. R.R., 103 N.Y. 58, 8 N.E. 335 (1886); see Harold
Marsh, Jr., Are DirectorsTrustees?, 22 Bus. Law. 35, 36 (1967).
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bar the close scrutiny by the courts in cases where illegalities, gift of assets,
fraud or domination is asserted. Although it was said that these statutes shifted
the burden of proof from defendant to plaintiff, this is only true if one bears
in mind that in the older view the defenses were disinterest or entire fairness,
while now the plaintiff would have to allege the illegality, fraud or domination,
against which allegation the defendant has the burden of proof as to the entire
fairness.
E. Management Fee Cases Fully Litigated
1 51
v.
1. Meiselman Eberstadt
This case involved a derivative suit by a stockholder of Chemical Fund,
against the fund, its directors, the investment adviser, which is also its underwriter, and the individual partners in the partnership which owned all of the
stock of the adviser-underwriter. The non-affiliated directors, who constituted
the majority of the board, were discharged because the plaintiff could not prove
domination. The fund had assets of 300 million dollars and was managed under
an advisory contract, with scaled down fees' 52 paying for almost all expenses.
The claim was that the managers, through the management contract device, paid
themselves excessive compensation, although they were fiduciaries.
The court held for defendants on the grounds that their activities were the
common practice in the industry, e.g. the approval by independent directors and
ratification by the shareholders. Plaintiff contended that the fund paid too
much in relation to the time spent on the fund's business, but the court disposed of this contention saying that time should not be related to payments
in terms percentages. Furthermore, the fund also benefited from the partnership's activities in other fields. The court also gave some thought to performance
and to the fact that as to each director separately the compensation would not
seem excessive in the light of the duties and responsibilities.
Meiselman v. Eberstadt represented a very typical situation, 15 3 in that it
concerned one of the few funds that had scaled-down fees in 1961. It was also
advantageous in that the contract provided for almost all the expenses of the
fund, which is, even now, rather seldom encountered. 1 4 The conclusions are
almost only factual. The court agreed with the basis of the complaint, that is,
that the matter should be handled as a management remuneration. Obviously
the case was hopeless for plaintiff, and therefore defendant elected to meet the
contentions on the merits. Therefore, not much attention should be given to
the court's reasoning that the fund also benefited from the activities of the
individual defendants in other business relations.155
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Messelman v. Eberstadt, 39 Del. Ch. 563, 170 A.2d 720 (1961).
0.5% up to $75 million; 0.375% on $75 to $125 million; 0.25% on excess.
Cf. SEC Report 134.
Id. at 91, table 111-2.
SEC Report 134, n.145.
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2. Saxe v. Brady 56
This landmark case involved a derivative suit by a shareholder of Fundamental Investors, Inc. of Delaware. The action was brought against the fund's
directors, the adviser and the underwriter under a plea of "unreasonable and
excessive (fees) and an illegal spoliation of the fund's assets." The fund was
serviced under a regular 0.5 of 1% management contract computed on the
average daily net assets. The adviser also furnished investment advice to three
other, smaller funds under similar contract. Some directors were affiliated with
the adviser, and plaintiff accused them of breach of trust and of manipulation
of the independent directors. Pending litigation, 99.1% of the 76% of the votes
cast ratified the renewal of the management contract, although attention was
drawn in the proxy statement to the current litigation and the effects thereon.
The court, per Chancellor Seitz, held for defendants.
a. The complaint for insufficient disclosure in the proxy statement was not
upheld because the court found that no material misrepresentation was committed. Plaintiff alleged that certain expense items between the adviser and the
closely affiliated underwriter were improperly allocated and therefore misrepresented the real cost of management. The court found this not only irrelevant
because the Fund would have to pay for it anyway, but also that as a legal
matter it was within the realm of the adviser-underwriter business judgment to
allocate expenses as it saw fit.
b.

Contention of waste of assets.

The court first spelled out the applicable rule and its foundation:
When the stockholders ratify a transaction, the interested parties are
relieved of the burden of proving the fairness of the transaction. The
burden then falls on the objecting stockholders to convince the courts
that no person of ordinary, sound business judgment would be expected
to entertain the view that the consideration was a fair exchange for
the value which was given. . . .While the cited cases involved stock
options, one of the fundamental issues there presented, viz. the relationship of the value received by the corporation to the benefit bestowed,
is also present here. The test which the court must apply in this area
has recently been restated in Beard v. Elster ...While the Supreme
Court was not there concerned with interested board action, it took
occasion to review157the Gottlieb decision and reaffirmed the principles
expressed therein.
The court elucidated its test:
Its examination . ..is limited solely to discovering whether what the
corporation has received is so inadequate in value that no person of
ordinary, sound business judgment would deem it worth what the
corporation has paid. If it can be said that ordinary businessmen might
156.
157.

Saxe v. Brady 40 Del. Ch. 474, 184 A.2d 602 (1962).
Id. at 486, 184 A.2d at 610.
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differ on the sufficiency
of the terms, then the court must validate
1 8
the transaction. 6
Further, the court inquired whether the discrepancy between what the corporation received and what was paid for was so large as to be unconscionable. In
determining this discrepancy, the court followed different lines of reasoning:
i. the fee structure itself. The court found that a percentage of assets
approach is not only a common feature in the mutual fund field, but
that it was also a legitimate incentive for the adviser. The fee structure
per se did not warrant equitable intervention:
If a particular fund evidences a history of continued growth for a
period of years with a consequent increase in the amount of compensation, courts will not readily find in retrospect that the compensation
paid was beyond the range of reason. Where the rate of payment has
remained unchanged, one must recognize both a legitimate expectation
on the part of the managers and a reasonable notice to the stockholders
that payments are likely to increase. 1 9
ii. the dollar amount paid.
On plaintiff's suggestion the court compared the fund with other funds,
but included two funds which were concurrently under shareholder attack for
the same reason. The court admitted that not all services rendered should be
identical, nor that performance should be a "touchstone" in determining whether
fees are reasonable. Nevertheless, the court found that it appeared from the
comparison that defendant fund had performed better, that there were differences in quantity and quality of services performed and that the other funds
certainly did not indicate the outer limits of payment.
c. Amount of profit earned.
Because the adviser also managed three other funds, the court first had to
allocate expenses and profits attributable to the defendant fund. Finally an
80/20 ratio was agreed on. But even then the court was of the opinion that the
profits were not legally excessive. It was admitted that investment advisers may
make profits, although they may become so large as to be "shocking" by any
appropriate standard. The court found the comparison with other funds relevant
but did not find any data in the evidence.
d. Economies of size.
If the court approved some principle of economies of size, it was not willing
to compare fees paid a few years before as an upper limit. And even on itself,
it found it questionable whether the payments were excessive:
158.

Id.

159.

Id. at 488, 184 A.2d at 612; see infra note 165 and accompanying text.
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If this fund was to do its own work and make all compensation payments to its own personnel, a court would be reluctant to say that total
expenses of about $3,500,000 to administer a fund of $600,000,00
indicated waste. It is true that other funds obtain the same for less
but that is not decisive. Certainly Fund does not stand alone. Nor is it
unusual to find service companies making large profits with relatively
small costs. 160
Finally the reasoning was on the assumption that no independent board
had intervened. This, concluded the court, makes plaintiff's cause the more
questionable, although it agreed that economies of size should exist and that
the management should not demand sums that are shocking or unconscionable.
Saxe v. Brady is far more important than Meiselman v. Eberstadt,in that it
had a tremendous impact on then pending cases, several of which were settled
in the light of the standard of "shocking" discrepancy as applied in Saxe.- 6'
The court in Saxe applied the rule for excessive remuneration. However, on first
look, it could also have applied the rule for contracts between corporations
having directors in common. The question was not argued as far as appears
from the opinion. The reasoning of the court in inquiring as to the different
aspects of the payments under the contract would seem more appropriate to
an interlock approach than to a waste of assets reasoning.
The management contract is primarily a service contract, in that it does
not transfer all the powers of the board. Legally at least, important segments
of the board's activities are left untouched by the contract. So, for instance,
the right to terminate the contract, the right to enter into other contracts as
with the custodian, counsel, underwriter, or auditors are some of the powers
left in the hands of the board. Moreover, the recommendations made by the
adviser are not legally binding for the board. A comparison could be drawn with
the situation where a lawyer is a member of the board while his partnership
gives legal advice to the corporation. There, the payments made under the
retainer also are different from those received by the board member as such.
There also, the advice can have important bearing upon the decisions of the
board. However, the factual difference should not be lost sight of. Indeed, a
very difficult question in this context is posed by the fact that the advisory
contract in many cases provides for the remuneration of the affiliated directors
and officers. Conversely, it seems illogical to attribute the whole management
fee to "management expenses" since it would be regarded as directors' or
officers' compensation. The management fee pays for much more than would
normally be performed by an inside board. So for Massachusetts Investors
Trust, where the compensation of the trustees for 1965 amounted to $1,668,166,
the research and general office expense item absorbed $1,078,206.162 The reason160. Id. at 497, 184 A.2d at 616.
161. See SEC Report 138-41.
162. Massachusetts Investors Trust, Prospectus April 14, 1966, as amended, October
27, 1966.
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ing of the court in Saxe would therefore seem inappropriate, since neither the
fee structure itself, nor the dollar amount to be paid, nor the profits earned by
the adviser, nor the fees paid in previous years would come under the heading
of directors' or officers' compensation. A reallocation of expenses by the adviser
would therefore be necessary in order to determine which part of the management fee was due for the activities of the affiliated directors and officers within
the fund, and which part was attributable to the service contract as such. As
the amounts of remuneration of these persons can be brought under what is
usually called the "business judgment" of the advisor corporation, the amount
proposed by the adviser could not be held conclusive, but other evaluations, as
the cost of the services and the time spent could also enter into play. Therefore, if a plaintiff attacks the amounts paid to the affiliated director, regardless
of the allocation question, it would seem reasonable to bring the question under
the waste standard, as set forth in the section on compensation. If the contention
goes against the whole advisory fee, this approach should be coupled with the
strict fairness test as prevailing in regard to contracts between corporations with
common directors. Here the allocation will pose serious problems. Additional
disclosure would seem appropriate in this matter. 163
3. Acampora v. Birkland'64
In this case the 0.5 of 1%o management fee of Financial Industrial Fund
was challenged by one of its shareholders who brought suit against the fund,
the adviser, the underwriter, which controlled the adviser, all directors and
officers of the fund and three principal officers of the adviser-underwriter
complex. Plaintiff stated several complaints which were all rejected. The relevant
part related to a charge of excessive management fees, which were said to be
"equitably excessive" in relation to costs, i.e., expenses born by the adviser.
Originally plaintiff had charged that the fees were excessive per se, but this
complaint was abandoned in light of Saxe v. Brady. Therefore the complaint
was reworded to allege that the fees were excessive because defendant-adviser
did not provide all the services normally provided for under 0.5 of 1o management contracts. The court held for defendants, applying the standard of
"shocking" or "unconscionable" compensation, as expressed in Saxe. But several
of the considerations of the court are noteworthy. The court was of the opinion
that performance was a relevant factor and that economies of size were realized
in the management of the fund (the net assets totaled about $243 million).
Though these issues were not involved directly, they should be brought to the
attention of other authorities. Also contained in the opinion are interesting
elements as to the use of comparative materials. The court, confronted with an
abundant amount of data relating to the funds, obviously has had some difficulty
163.

See generally text accompanying infra notes 170-91.

164. Acampora v. Birkland, 220 F. Supp. 527 (D.Col. 1963).
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in determining the value of the different services, which value, as the court
said, is "a matter of judgment on the part of the persons who pay for them,"
thus giving credit to a long line of statements which took the view that investors
should "fend for themselves."' 165 On comparison of the expense ratio of the
fund with that of other funds, the court concluded that it was not "unreasonably
high." The atmosphere was ably described in the following words:
Judged by the tests set forth in Saxe, that is, unconscionable and
shocking, it cannot be said from the evidence here presented that the
amount paid was excessive because it was impossible to evaluate the
services rendered. The fact that it seems high to this writer is not
reliable. Furthermore, the net profits of Management do not appear
to be unreasonably high.166
The writer of the opinion almost acknowledged that the present test is inadequate.
It is unnecessary to stress that this decision is wholly in line with the
Meiselman and Saxe cases. Eventually the court added some new viewpoints on
the matter, but this did not affect its basic line of reasoning. Several of the
elements encountered in the previous decisions appear again: reliance on the
sophistication of the stockholders, the difficulty in comparing data relating to
different funds, the weight given to the expense ratio, alad so on. The profits
realized by the adviser appear also in the decision. This is certainly not an
inappropriate standard when other elements of the fee structure are unknown.
The same reasoning coupled with a cost comparison could give results, provided
the expenses covered are identical and comparable. But in light of Saxe, the
same comment would probably apply here.
F. State Law-Conclusion
From the foregoing review of the relevant state law, one cannot escape
the conclusion that the protection of investors leaves much to be desired in this
field. The economies of scale, which the SEC Report thoroughly underlined, have
only been realized to a minor extent in the existing management contracts. The
main devices Congress provided to protect investors, viz., independent directors
and compulsory shareholder approval, have not worked out too well. This was
due to the inherent structure of the mutual funds. Litigation, as far as it now
exists, has only added to the stability of the current management rates. When
courts had to apply existing legal theories to these corporations, which did not
entirely fit into the pattern for whiich which these theories were designed, the
165. SEC v. Ralston Purina, 346 U.S. 119 (1952); "We feel that the level of the advisory fee is a question for stockholders to decide. If they want to pay a man a million
dollar ... this bill says that is perfectly all right." Hearigs on S. 3580, Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 76th Cong. 3d Sess. 590 (1940).
166. Acampora v. Birkland 220 F. Supp. at 549. "It is the thesis of this article that

the law for corporations is different from the law for mutual funds." Mutual funds should
be appraised as a social fact and understood as a "nexus of social forces," Lebell, Right and
Responsibilitiesin the Mutual Fund, 70 Yale L.J. 1259 (1961).
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risk was great that the result would not be satisfactory. The main elements
that cause this diversion from the basic corporate pattern are the externalization
of management, the interference of the Investment Company Act, the apathy of
1 17
the shareholders and the anomalous position of the unaffiliated directors.
However, one can pose the question whether any other result could have
been reached within the existing legal system. The precedents, among which
Saxe v. Brady takes the leading position, seriously disfavor plaintiff's chances
to bring an action on other grounds than excessive management compensation.
One can but regret that no other course has ever been followed. It could have
resulted in a stricter criterion of fairness, which, in its actual application, would
have come close to the standard of reasonableness which the Commission now
proposes. Moreover, it would have avoided the need for legislative intervention.
However, one must remark that the standard of reasonableness differs from a
criterion of "utmost fairness," in that the former does not imply a breach of a
fiduciary duty. The difficulty therefore would be the appraisal of the content of
each standard. If properly applied, "utmost fairness" would also take into
account "all relevant factors," as the Commission proposes. Of course, under
the standard of utmost fairness, the rulemaking power of the Commission would
not exist. Further, the obstacles arising from approval and ratification could
be cumbersome. Indeed courts have been willing to disregard these defenses,
especially when domination was involved. However, in Saxe v. Brady the Chancellor attached the greatest importance to the approval defense. This was
clearly consistent with the Congressional policy and purpose. On the other hand,
as stated before, when directors were found to have breached their fiduciary
duties, courts were willing to regard the ratification as being "nothing."' 08 In
the mutual fund system, the possibility of seeing ratification as well as approval
disregarded, absent a contrary Congressional policy, seems remote. Therefore,
it would appear that if Saxe v. Brady had been decided on other grounds, the
intervention of Congress in the management fee sector could have been avoided.
However, this does not solve the problems relating to the adequacy of the remedy
and the difficulties of proof. The remarks relating to the Commission's proposed
standard of reasonableness would also apply as to the utmost fairness test.
Other possibilities of action exist under the federal standard of "gross
167. The Commission proposes to tighten the control clauses relating to affiliated
directors while it also proposes that approval would not have any impact on the appraisal of reasonableness by the courts. The conflict in this position is difficult to explain.
This could be another argument for the mere abrogation of the requirement for unaffiliated directors.
168.

A suggestion that because Congress left out the provisions making trustees of

the managers, is not indicative of an intention to eliminate the director's responsibility for
their actions and the actions of their subordnates in gross violation of the investor's confidence. See Note, Private Cause of Action Against Directors Not Implied by the Investment

Company Act, 13 Stan. L. Rev. 964 (1961). If it is true that reliance is an important element

in establishing a fiduciary relationship, it is unclear to what extent directors of investment

companies will be subject to a standard of conduct more stringent than for other directors,
see text accompanying supra notes 57-58.
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misconduct or gross abuse of trust", as contained in section 36 of the Investment Company Act. However, this solution also has several disadvantages. As
the section now stands, only the Commission has a right to bring an action,
tending to discontinue the relationship between the adviser and the fund, which
is the least feasible solution. Further, the standard of conduct does not seem
very much stricter then the criterion of "shocking" as applied in Saxe. Obviously, section 36 was not designed for this purpose. 169
As the law now stands, it is at least doubtful whether plaintiff could get
a reduction of management fees. The Commission proposes an alternative solution to fill this gap. This solution seems to come close, if not in principle, at
least in application, to the "utmost fairness" test as applied in cases relating
to intercorporate contracts with adversely interested directors.
VI. T=x

SEC

The SEC Report clearly shows that mutual funds have shared in the
savings realized through the growth of the assets of the fund only to a relatively
small extent. As a critique of the findings of the Commission would be beyond
the scope of this paper, the attention will be limited to the Commission's
recommendations.
The proper recommendations of the Commission, it should first be remarked,
build further on the existing legal pattern. The standard of fairness, which is
replaced by the more sensitive requirement of reasonableness and which is based
on different grounds, is the current touchstone in corporate self-dealing.170
However, some of the problems encountered under existing legal theories will
also arise under the Commission's proposed standard of reasonableness. The
main issue will again be what reasonableness is. In its recommendations, the
Commission obviously evaded precisely defining what will be understood by a
reasonable management contract. A further refinement will be expected from
the legislative proposals, and from the rules and regulations which will be
enacted by the Commission under its present view of the question. As the matter
now stands, a discussion of reasonableness can only be pursued under the handicap of the vagueness of the recommendations.
General ideas emerge from the first reading of the recommendation.
The standard of reasonableness [will] be applied in the light of all
relevant factors, including the fees paid for comparable services by
other financial institutions with pools of investment capital of like
size and purpose such as pension and profit sharing plans, insurance
companies, trust accounts, and other investment companies; the nature and quality of the services provided; all benefits directly or in169. On these subjects see: Eisenberg & Lehr, An Aspect of Emerging "Federal Corporation Law": Directorial Responsibility under the Investment Company Act of 1940,
20 Rutgers L. Rev. 181 (1965).
170. The applicability of the standard of fairness is broader in that it reaches all
contracts of the fund for services furnished, regardless of the affiliation of the contractor.
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directly received by persons affiliated with an investment company and
their affiliated persons by virtue of their relationship with an investment company; and such competitive and other factors as the Commission may by rule or regulation or, after notice and opportunity
for hearing, by order determine are appropriate and material in the
public interest.1 71
The most obvious conclusion that one can make from this reading is that the
standard of reasonableness will further be defined by the Commission and
that it will have to be interpreted in the "light of all relevant factors."
The power of the Commission to further define elements or guidelines for
reasonableness will not necessarily result in rate-regulation, because only criteria on which courts will have to rely will be clarified. However, the impact on
the advisory contracts should not be underestimated, and the Commission will
have a powerful tool to bend management contracts in the direction it deems
appropriate in the public interest. Absent regulation by the Commission, the
question remains what are the criteria on which courts will have to rely. These
criteria will also influence the regulation enacted in this matter.
It is presently difficult to enumerate all factors that could have any bearing
upon the reasonableness of management contracts. The size of the funds administered will certainly be a relevant factor. The "nature and quality of services provided" poses serious problems. The "nature of services" was probably
meant to refer to the great disparity which presently exists in the services
covered by the management fee. The report gives a statistical survey of 100
funds, wherefrom it can be concluded that the management contracts are rather
12
chaotically structured.. SEC regulation would also put an end to this situation.
Under the nature of the services, the Commission might also have understood
the cost of investment advice. The prudent cost approach is a notion common
to other sectors of rate regulation. It is, however, not without difficulties in its
application. Brought before a court, the prudence of certain costs or expenses
will eventually come under the broad shelter of the business judgment rule.
Though this rule ordinarily refers to the discretionary powers of the managers
of a single corporation, it could be said to apply also to cases where the management function was broadly delegated. If this were not accepted in court, the
situation could arise where the fiduciary relationship would tend to require an
explanation of appropriateness of all activities undertaken by the adviser.
This would create additional problems in cases where the adviser simultaneously
acts for other clients, whether fund or non-fund clients, because less warranted
overhead-expenses, in which the fund partly shares and of which it benefits,
can be economically warranted in light of the needs of the other clients. A proper
allocation of expenses, the prudence of which can be proved in each case, seems
extremely difficult. Assuming, for argument's sake, that the prudence of expenses
171.
172.

SEC Report 91.
See Id. 91, Table 111-2.
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comes under the business judgment of the adviser, an analogous situation of
allocation of expenses would result. Some of the problems here involved should
be stressed. Affiliated directors of externally managed funds usually receive
no compensation for their activities within a certain fund. At least this does
not appear on the financial statements of the fund, because the compensation
is assumed by the adviser under the total management fee. To a lesser extent,
officers and employees of the fund are similarly treated. The renumeration of
these persons will not only apply question of business judgment, but will
eventually come under the "prudence of expenses requirement." 173 Apart from
this difficulty, directors probably do not receive separate compensation for their
activities in a certain fund. Their eventually theoretical remuneration should
be treated as an expense of the adviser. If they serve for several funds simultaneously, the allocation will have to be made. The criterion therefore could
be the time spent on the business of a particular fund. This is at most a doubtful
criterion. Similar problems exist as to the other expense items of the adviser,
especially when the adviser simultaneously acts for several funds, or for several
other non-fund clients. The allocation of costs to a particular fund will often
be arbitrary. For example, an investment manager acting for two funds, one
aiming at long term growth, the other at income, will have another expense
structure than the adviser acting for two funds of a similar nature.
The possible considerations relating to a cost approach could be continued
by pointing to the recommended comparison with other institutional investors.
There the fear of comparing apples to oranges becomes even greater. Further
consideration should be given to policy and investment objective, which is
more obvious when comparing mutual funds to other institutional investors,
such as insurance companies. It should also be borne in mind that the question
of prudent costs only leads to results when combined with an addition to the
costs of a certain percentage for fair return. The report found that profit margins
of mutual fund investment advisers were higher for advisers acting only for fund
clients than for those having non-fund clients. But it is unclear what elements
enter into play when defining the term "income" on which the Commission
computes the profit margin. 17 4 The same remarks are valid here as the Special
Study pointed out in regard to Stock Exchange Commission structures.175 The
need for a fair return on capital will become more urgent as more investment
managers go public.7 6 But, the determination of fair return raises the fear
of arbitrariness.
173. It iswell known that cost of services, as those here involved, is extremely difficult to determine. Eventually one could think on a normal compensation basis, deemed to
be the cost of the employment. The difference in quality of a certain director would be
reflected in the performance based part of the management fee. Salaries paid by the in-

vestment adviser to the affiliated director would therefore be irrelevant.
174.
175.
176.
Advisory

SEC Report 121.
Special Study pt. If, at 336.
Jaretzki, Jr., The Investment Company Act: Problems Relating to the Investment
Contracts, 45 Va. L. Rev. 1023, 1035 (1959).
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Presently only one fund complex has its management fee related to the
cost of services provided. The so-called Broad Street complex, consisting of
a closed-end investment company, Tri-Continental Corporation, and three
mutual funds, namely Broad Street Investing Corporation, National Investors
Corporation and Whitehall Fund, totalling assets of almost $1.5 billion, is organized on a non-profit basis. The four investment companies receive investment
advice from a wholly owned corporation on a cost basis, whereby the costs of the
subsidiary are divided among the four investment companies on the basis of
assets managed. Although the investment advisory contract does not cover
several items usually provided for in other mutual funds, the expense rations
of these investment companies were substantially lower than the industry
average. The data related to this fund complex could eventually be used as
17
comparative material in a cost-of-service approach. 7
The cost computation should, however, also be combined with the factor
of performance. The SEC Report generally stated that the quality of the
services provided would be relevant in judging the reasonableness of the management fee. In the field of stock exchange commissions, the quality of services
was also held to be of great importance. Also, performance was upheld by the
courts as a relevant factor in determining the fairness of the management
contract and hence a legitimate motivation for higher compensation. This is
seemingly also the position of the Commission, where it said that "the sustained
investment performance of a company would be an appropriate consideration
in evaluating the reasonableness of its adviser's compensation.' 178 It would
seem that in the opinion of the Commission, performance is a relevant factor
ex post facto, thus warranting a finding of reasonableness. On the other hand,
at the end of the report, the Commission outlaws any computation of management fees, which according to the existing rule for investment advisers, as
defined in the Investment Company Act, is made on the basis "of a share of
capital gains or capital appreciation of the funds of the client." 179 The underlying reason is that this could result in unwise investment management, eventually churning of the portfolio and serious damage to the investor. On the other
hand, one could argue that the percentage of "profits" realized by the management of the fund could be put at such a level where it would leave enough
incentive for the adviser to try harder, without endangering the adviser's fair
return on his capital, in other words, without practically compelling him to take
177. Note, The Mutual Fund and its Management Company, An Analysis of Business
Incest, 71 Yale L.J. 137, 157 (1961) points to the feasibility of a cost approach.
178. SEC Report 145.
179. Id. 345. Compare the guidelines of the Investment Counsel Association of
America: "Compensation of an investment counsel firm should consist exclusively of direct
charges to clients for services rendered, and should not be contingent upon profits, the
number or value of the transactions executed, nor upon maintenance of a minimum income,"
in J. W. Hazard & M. Chustie, The Investment Business 94 (1964).
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greater risks than are allowed under the statement of policy in order to make
his enterprise viable.
The courts also have held that remuneration based on the profits realized
by the able management of the directors are legitimate, although, as the Supreme Court said in Rogers v. Hill,i80 this remuneration should not rise to a
point where it is a waste of corporate assets. The Commission rejects this view
under clear policy reasons.
As far as the judicial determination of reasonableness is concerned, making
the reasonableness of management dependent upon performance will put intricate problems before the courts. The first issue to be decided is what is
performance. A judicial analysis of performance will necessarily go further
than the actually few existing formulas where management fees were made
contingent upon performance. Performance is first related to the policy of the
fund. It can mostly be expressed in terms of income, whether from interest
or dividends, and of capital gains, whether realized or unrealized. It is more
doubtful whether courts will be willing to take into account that part of performance which can be said to be mere expectation.
Further, one should not forget that performance is a relative notion and
that, if courts are going to rely on it, they will have to go through the same
reasoning with respect to other funds, eventually of a different nature, with
other institutional investors and with the securities markets generally. As to
this last point of reference, the evaluation of performance will be even more
difficult as the widely used indexes might be of less relevance in the comparison,
e.g., a fund investing in stocks of a certain number of states should not be
compared with a nation-wide index. 181 In almost any case, the advice of a
financial analyst will become necessary, which is very burdensome as parties
will not easily rely on the opinion of one expert.
Making management fees contingent upon performance is therefore not
a task which should be exercised by the courts. The Commission could set some
definite guidelines for testing investment performance. This could eventually
result in a greater conformity of the management contracts. Under the actually
existing formulas, the solution does not seem entirely satisfactory; making
management fees exclusively dependent upon "profits" puts high pressures
upon the adviser. One of the larger funds, which happens to be also one of the
best performing in the last year, is serviced under a management contract providing for a 10% fee on the income from interests and dividends, as well as on
the difference between net realized capital gains and the unrealized net losses
(defined as the difference between unrealized capital gains and the unrealized
losses) .182 Under another formula, the management fee consists of a percentage
180.
181.
1 (1963)
182.

289 U.S. 582 (1932).
Lobell, A Critique on the Wharton School Report on Mutual Funds, 49 Va. L. Rev.
found that the Moody Index, used in the Report, lacked broadness.
Oppenheimer Fund, assets May 1, 1966; 53, 291; expense ratio: 1.41%; in the
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of the aggregate of dividends, interest and investment profit.183 A fund, recently
approved by the Commission and of a speculative nature, has its management
fee tied to net assets and to performance. Substantially the agreement provides
for a fee of 1% of the average net assets up to $10 million and 2 of % on
the excess. A 10% charge is made on the net realized gains from sales of securities minus net unrealized depreciation, and on dividends and interest. The
prospectus adds that this might result in considerably greater fees than those
based solely upon a percentage of net assets.184
Certainly more sensible formulas can be contrived whereby part of the
management fee would be based upon performance, part on the cost basis.
Management fees based exclusively upon net assets, as are the vast majority of
the funds now, seem a less appropriate approach to just compensation of
management efforts. Indeed, net assets reflect essentially sales effort and only
to a minor extent the gains realized by skillful management. In the scaled-down
fees, also based on net assets, which is the prevailing structure in many of the
larger funds nowadays, the main advantages, viz, economies of size and performance, are reflected in the proposed cost-performance formula. However, it
has been argued that this would result in a higher management cost for the
smaller funds, which cannot profit from the economies of size that larger funds
could realize. Insofar as economies of size are the expression of the size of the
fund, this is true; it is but the mere counterpart of the general economic rule
that a larger output will result in a lowering of the price, at least to a certain
extent. If now the management fee were the real expression of the "reasonable
cost" of investment advice, a similar situation would appear. This would certainly put the larger funds in a more favorable position and could therefore
represent certain dangers as to the size of the fund. This danger exists however
in any other corporate field. Where anti-trust laws were enacted to promote
competition. The more peculiar dangers flowing from the size of certain investment companies, and hence their dominant position, are only a remote consequence of the fact that management fees are lower. Also some weight should
be given to performance, and this probably would require an analysis of the
investment decision of the mutual fund investors. Probably the level of management fees plays only a minor role in this decision. Therefore legislative intervention would have to go in the direction of restoring the economies of size,
even if this is only a minor factor in the investment decision, and also to protect
the public interest. Absent real arm's length bargaining, it would amount to
a simulation of arm's length bargaining.
The standard of reasonableness, as proposed by the Commission, would
further be related to what exists in other financial institutions. This comparison
year ended Sept. 30, 1966 it realized an increase of 11.1% while the Dow Jones Industrial
Average fell 16.8%. See Capital Gains Research Bureau, Newsweek, Nov. 7, 1966, at 83.
183. Technical Fund, assets June 30, 1966, § 597, at 334; expense ratio: 5.74%. See id.
184. The Hubschman Fund was incorporated Jan. 10, 1966.

MUTUAL FUNDSwas already seriously objected to because the performance of these institutions
was so far below the performance of the mutual funds that any comparison
would be futile. But accepting that this is true, it does not explain the large
difference between the fee structures. Probably other reasons could partly explain why pension plans, for instance, are managed at rates that cannot easily
be compared with the prevailing 0.5 of 1%o. The most plausible explanation is
that here competitive forces, to a larger extent, have brought about a lowering
of the management fees. However, some weight also should be given to other
factors, such as the securities in which the assets are invested and the unrelated
profits realized by the banks. Therefore, this criterion, if it is appropriate,
should only be used after the Commission has clearly shown on which points
and how far the comparison should go. 185
Analogous difficulties are encountered when the Commission proposes to
relate management fees to "all benefits directly or indirectly received by persons
affiliated with an investment company and their affiliated persons by virtue of
their relationship with an investment company". This sentence could have meant
several things.' 86 First, it could have aimed at subjecting to some test of
reasonableness all considerations paid by the adviser to affiliated persons, which
could include the underwriter, affiliates from which the adviser purchases
investment information, affiliated brokerage houses through which the adviser
channels its portfolio transactions and many more. Although this reading is
rather on the broad side, it would literally encompass these situations. Conversely, it would not apply to directed give-ups for sales promotion, which can be
said to benefit the adviser and the underwriter, but in the first instance favor
the person to whom the give-up is directed. This last point could eventually
come under the clause "such competitive and other factors."
The subsidizing of underwriters, whether directly or through give-ups,
is a widespread practice, according to a finding of the Wharton Report and
of the SEC Report. 187 This certainly benefits the adviser who, in that way, tries
to gain more assets managed and hence more management fees. On the other
185. An emphatic rebuttal to the SEC Investment Company Report of March 19,
1967, is critical about the comparison with "other institutional investors," as described in
the SEC Report. Would the comparison have to be extended to those new forms of investment companies as variable annuities, bank administered common trust funds, small
business investment companies? Sheedy, A Tangled Web? Some PeripheralProblems Under
the Investment Company Act, 17 W. Res. L. Rev. 1011 (1966); Note, The Ezpanding Juris-

diction of the S.E.C., Variable Annuities and Bank Collective Investment Funds, 62 Mich.
L.Rev. 1998 (1964).
186. Gardner v. Morgan, Civil 32834, ED. Pa. Feb. 11, 1963, cited in Note, Mutual
Funds and the Investment Advisory Contract, RGC, 50 Va. L. Rev. 141 (1964) ("[T]he
interesting contention has been made that the directors of the Fund and its shareholders
of the valuable corporate opportunity of receiving or having a subsidiary receive the award
of the advisory contract and of large advisory fees?') This would amount to a quasi-internalization of the mutual funds. It is not dear in how far corporate opportunity has been
diverted if it related to expenses the fund had to bear in any event. On this subject see
Eisenberg, & Lehr, supra note 169, at 252.
187. Mutual Fund Report 125.
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hand, according to the Commission's findings, three out of ten distribution
organizations affiliated with the largest advisory organizations worked at a loss,
while the profit margins were substantially lower for the distribution business
than for the advisory business. This could mean that actual profits from distribution do not make the business viable, but might also mean that profits
from advisory business are seemingly too high. Probably it is both. A change in
management fee could therefore have consequences on the distribution side,
while the reverse situation could also occur. Subjecting the management fee to
a test which would take into account this subsidizing, could put the underwriter
in serious danger and eventually harm the fund, which has need for a continuous
inflow of capital to match the redemptions. 188
The same requirement could have even further consequences, in that it
would subject all contracts of the adviser with affiliate persons to a test of
reasonableness. If benefits mean excessive consideration, it would but disregard
the corporate entity. Also the problem of give-ups will be raised in this context.
Give-ups benefiting affiliated persons will be relevant factors in testing the
reasonableness of the fee. The question is clear if the give-up is merely channelled to an affiliate. However, when the give-up is directed to an unaffiliated
salesman, for the purpose of promoting sales effort, the underwriter and certainly also the adviser will receive certain, valuable benefits. Will these benefits
be computed on the basis of the amount of the give-up, or on the amount of
the benefit received by the affiliate or the adviser? One could argue that as the
fund can in no way benefit from the give-ups, the question is irrelevant. But as
far as the adviser stands in a fiduciary relationship, directing give-ups to purposes that are not for the benefit of the fund would seem inconsistent with his
duties of loyalty. In the law of trusts, commissions earned in performing the
fiduciary duties benefit the trust estate, if the trustee acts in good faith.
Eventually the trustee may keep the commission as proper compensation. By
analogy, there would seem to be a duty on this fiduciary to use this part of the
commission, which is at its disposition, for the exclusive benefit of the fund.
Again the relation between the amount of the give-up and the services received
would be subject to dispute. Furthermore, and insofar as the investment adviser has fiduciary duties to the mutual fund shareholders, shareholder-directed
give-ups could give raise to fine legal problems. Making ordinary give-ups a
relevant factor in determining the reasonableness of the management fee would
not seem inappropriate, but in some cases very difficult to appraise. On the
other hand, changes in the stock exchanges' commission rate structures would
certainly affect the reasonableness of management fess.
Assuming that the court has gone through all these considerations and has
188. In Matter of Investors Diversified Services, Inc., 30 SEC 273, 277 (1949)
where the Commission raised the question in connection with the underwriter. Conwill,
Blight or Blessing, The Wharton School Study of Mutual Funds, 18 Bus. Law. 663 (1963)
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determined that the management fee is either reasonable or unreasonable, it would
probably have taken several months, if not years, and necessitate considerable
amounts of money. For the small investors, whose protection is at stake here,
this is too risky an enterprise. He would probably be pleased to pay forty-five
cents per hundred dollars to have his savings managed, while the fund would
give him ample satisfaction. Obviously the enforcement of the standard of reasonableness cannot be left to the scattered investors only, 8 9 but as the Commission proposed, it should be allowed to bring actions, or intervene in actions, for
violation of a Federal statute. Although much ground which is left uncovered
under the present standard of fairness would come under the powers of the
court, the Commission would only be willing to intervene in the more blatant
cases. Systematic action seems unfeasible, while action at random could raise
suspicions of some kind of discrimination. Furthermore, even on SEC action,
the solution would seem too inflexible, because at the time the final decision
intervenes, the situation of the fund can be so far changed that a new lawsuit
could be necessary. The Commission, further, joining in an action of an investor,
would be limited to the fund in which the investor chose to put his money,
while the other funds making part of the same complex would prefer to keep
quiet and expect further developments. The limitation of restitution to two
years would not work as an effective deterrent, as management cannot lose
much more anyway. Apart from the difficulties that will be encountered by
the courts in judging the reasonableness of fees, the fear also exists that courts
in different circuits, moved by different considerations, will render if not conflicting, eventually not concordant decisions. This would not only harm the adviser, but also the shareholders.
VII. CONCLUSION

The recommendations of the Commission build further on the existing
legal pattern. They propose a broadening of the standard of "fairness" by
requiring the courts to base their decision on "all relevant factors." In that
sense the recommendations will improve the chances of the plaintiffs. However,
to entrust the solution of this very intricate problem to the courts does not
seem the most sensible way to resolve the question, unless the Commission
sets the criteria on which reasonableness is going to be determined. The criteria
that are available from the recommendations are too vague to reach satisfying
results. The promulgation of a set of criteria could not be done without further,
prior study of the management fee question and the related problems that exist
in the mutual fund industry and even in the securities markets. Among the
relevant factors by which the study of the Commission will be guided are the
considerations of policy, the consequences and eventual distortions, factors limit189. See Note, Mutual Funds and Investment Advisory Contract, R.G.C., So Va. L.
Rev. 141 (1964) ("The public interest of other shareholders is not always adequately represented by a private suit, since there is a tendency towards settlement, which might leave
structural faults intact.").
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ing the validity of comparisons, structure of the investment advisers and establishing uniform criteria for services provided by the management contract,
and so on, which would place the whole question in a new light. The political
choices, by which certain solutions would be discarded, should be more clearly
established and special attention should be given to the possibility of internalization of the management function. The argument put forward by the report, viz.
that internalization would have adverse effects on the smaller funds, should be
clearly established after a study of the advisers servicing smaller funds.
If the Commission, for whatever reasons, is of the opinion that external
management of mutual funds should continue, subjecting the contracts to some
test of reasonableness, 190 it should at least set some definite criteria on which this
standard will be judged. This should not necessarily lead to rate-making, because
only the basis on which rates are going to be determined would be fixed by rules
or regulations. Each decision should involve a financial analysis of the corporate
situation involved. Attention should also be given to the far-reaching results of
administrative or judicial intervention, eventually causing a distortion in the
whole mutual fund pattern.
Other solutions could be proposed. Essentially in view of the lack of
flexibility of administrative rulings and the limited effect of judicial decrees,
a compromise solution could be found in the following scheme. One could
think of the creation of a self-regulatory body of a special kind, 0 1 composed
of members on which the Commission and the industry have agreed. Each mutual
fund would have to designate one member, who would be empowered with the
supervision of these activities of the fund as designated. The management
"contract" would have to be approved by this member in accordance with
flexible rules set by the self-regulatory body. Whether the management disagrees or whether the member deems the terms of the contract not in accordance
with the interest of the investors, and the manager refuses to change the contract
action could be brought before the body. Appeal would lie to the SEC, which
would be allowed to test the contract under broad terms of public policy.
However, this possible solution, which was only outlined in very broad
terms, is not free from critique. One could argue that it merely shifts the determination of "reasonableness" to a non-judicial body. This is true, so far as
no rules of the self-regulatory body exist. The broad power to set criteria to
which all management contracts would have to respond would probably meet
this objection. Further, it should be stressed that rather than leaving the determination of reasonableness to the courts, this solution would, without determining what are reasonable management fees, set criteria for what can be deemed
to be management contracts corresponding to the interests of the investors.
190. New York Times, May 2, 1967, at 63, col. 5 (Rep. Harley 0. Staggers of West
Virginia introduced a bill providing, inter alia, for the introduction of a standard of reasonableness. Hearings were scheduled for June 19, 1967.

191. See, e.g., J. W. Hazard & M. Chustie, supra note 179, at 406.
796

MUTUAL FUNDS
Another objection is that no arm's length bargaining, which is the cause
of the absence of competition among mutual fund managers, would be achieved
by this solution. However, unless making the mutual funds internally managed,
there seems to be no reason to disrupt the stable relationship between the fund
and its adviser. Competition among funds, insofar as it now exists, would be
shifted from matters of management fees to matters of performance, meaning
in this context the achieving of the investment policy. It would further avoid
the inflexibility inherent in SEC regulation, while the contracts themselves would
be under permanent supervision of an expert.
Certainly, many other solutions to this intricate problem could be devised,
with all their advantages and disadvantages. However, it seems fair to say that
any solution should be preceded by a thorough study considering all facts and
consequences. This is equally true of the Commission's recommendations.

